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IS ETHICS FOR SALE? ... JUGGLING LAW AND ETHICS IN
MANAGED CARE
June M McKoy, AD MPH JD LLM (Hon.), Kari L. Karsjens JD,
Matthew Wynia MD MPH, and Linda MacDonald-Glenn JD LLM
I. INTRODUCTION
The need for fundamental changes within the healthcare arena has long
been recognized and accepted. However, the debate as to the role that
managed care should play in determining patient treatment and the
interplay between ethics, law and the managed care of patients, remains
the subject of persistent and intense debate. Corporate business
practices, including cost-containment, are antithetical to the traditional
medical ethics that are the framework of the medical profession, and
the ever-encroaching corporate culture is on a dangerous collision
course with both medical ethics and the legal tenets that have offered it
support.
This Note will address the various facets of medical and legal
ethics in the courts and health care system. It will be divided into three
major sections. Sections II will provide a brief overview of the basic
principles of medical ethics and their common applications in the
managed care setting. Attention will be given to an overview of
relevant, ethical guidelines that are instructive in the context of
managed care decision-making. These sections will also identify and
analyze ethical issues raised by key court cases, outline collaborative
and practical attempts to improve fairness in coverage decisions within
managed care as a starting point for discussions on ethics in managed
care, and will discuss the issue of resource allocation and ethics in
managed care including ideas and principles identified in the newly
released 2004 Institute of Medicine report, Insuring America's Heath:
Principles and Recommendations. Section III will also evaluate
professional obligations, recent problems based on the complex
relationship of medical directors to contract law, and the application of
various codes of ethics to these circumstances to illustrate intersection
between medical ethics and legal ethics in managed care. Specifically,
the section will provide a brief overview of the traditional obligations
inherent in the physician-patient relationship, examine the interplay
between contract law and ethics, and evaluate the concept of the Plan as
a contract. Attention will then turn to an overview of the conflict
between the physician's fiduciary duty to the patient, and his/her fiscal
responsibility to the managed care organization (MCO), particularly the
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physician's professional obligations and contractual responsibilities
within the managed care environment. This section will conclude with
a brief discussion of the efforts by organized medicine to meet the
challenges of the physician's competing obligations both within the
boundaries of the managed care contract and within the ethical
framework of the medical profession. Section IV will evaluate
regulatory oversight and investigation within the managed care
environment, in addition to exploring the standard and scope of review
of medical licensing boards. By analyzing standards of professional
conduct, this section will provide additional insight into the thorny
issue of medical ethics in the regulatory arena and legal ethics in the
managed care organization.
II. ETHICS, BIOETHICS, AND APPLIED ETHICS
The advent of managed care is commonly portrayed as improperly
supplanting the principle that physicians consider the interests of
individual patients above all else to a perfectly functional and
consistent 2,000 year-old Hippocratic ethic. Since the time of Plato it
has been recognized that physicians oftentimes face intractable
situations of dual loyalties and competing obligations.' Physicians'
obligations toward public health may be the best-recognized example.
2
In this respect, managed reintroduces to physicians an ancient ethical
dilemma -- how to serve as trusted intermediaries between ill
individuals and our communities while sharing limited health care
resources.
Plato bluntly recognized this balancing act when he wrote that physicians were
"statesmen" who were to do what "is best for the patients and for the state." The
original 1847 Code of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association also
noted that a physician's skills "are qualities which he holds in trust for the general
good," and one of its three chapters - entitled, "Of the Duties of the Profession to the
Public, and of the Obligations of the Public to the Profession" - dealt explicitly with
physicians' social duties. More recently, Creuss and Creuss note that during the 19
h
century, "legal measures for the first time granted medicine a broad monopoly over
health care - along with both individual and collective autonomy - with the clear
understanding that in return medicine would concern itself with the health problems
of the society it served and would place the welfare of society above its own." See
generally RL Cruess and SR Cruess, Teaching medicine as a profession in the service
of healing, 72(11) ACAD MED. 941-52 (Nov. 1997).
2 M.G. Bloche, Clinical loyalties and the social purposes of medicine, 281 JAMA
268-74 (1999).
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A. The Origin of Ethics and Medical Professionalism
Until the creation of the American Medical Association's Code of
Medical Ethics in 1847, there was no consistent ethical construct in
which to place the obligations of "medical professionals" or, for that
matter, any other professionals.3 The Code of Ethics contained, for the
first time, a set of specific and widely recognized expectations that
applied to every American physician. Unlike the Hippocratic Oath that
represents a personal promise, the Code of Ethics was collective and
did not rely on appeals to personal virtue or to a deity.4 Instead, it
accepted and even promoted the idea that a claim of "professionalism"
entails a special social role governed by an explicit social contract., It
was only after the creation of this Code, that social scientists could, and
did, begin to explore the meaning and role of medical professionals in
society.
In the early part of the 20 th century, medical professionalism
was understood according to the structuralist-functionalist school of
Talcott Parsons and his students. 6 This approach listed distinctive
characteristics of professions and sought to delineate socially desirable
rationales for each characteristic. 7 For example, medical professionals
tend to take obligations of confidentiality very seriously because this
allows individuals to disclose sensitive information, such as data about
infectious disease exposures, which might prove useful in halting the
spread of disease. Another example is the value professionals place on
cooperation rather than competition since this trait speeds
dissemination of new and useful knowledge. When questioned as to
why physicians might not follow self-interest to maximize profits,
Parsons postulated that physicians did follow selfish interests, but
fortunately for society, their self-interests lie not in making money but
8in improving status amongst peers.
The structuralist-functionalist conception of the professions
came under attack from academic sociologists, such as Elliott Friedson
and Paul Starr, in the 1960s. These so-called "critical power theorists"
suspected that professionals were not as altruistic as had been claimed
3 See generally ROBERT B. BAKER ET AL., THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ETHICS
REVOLUTION: HOW THE AMA's CODE OF ETHICS HAS TRANSFORMED PHYSICIANS'
RELATIONSHIPS TO PATIENTS, PROFESSIONALS, AND SOCIETY (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 1999) (A major theme is the novelty of the AMA Code for its time).
4
1d.
5id.
6 Talcott Parsons, The professions and social structure, 17 SOC. FORCES 457, 457-67
(1939).7 1d.
8Id.
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and they collected data that, at least partially, supported this assertion.9
These critics starkly challenged physicians' ethics, claiming that
medical ethics were largely a cynical ploy to profit from monopoly
power in the market.' While some of these sociologists, most notably
Friedson, subsequently asserted the value of medical professionalism,
such as self-regulation and the norms created through codes of ethics,11
their fundamental criticism remains powerful, widely held, and
underlies landmark legal actions against physicians under antitrust
statutes. 12
But, the criticism that medical professionals are not civic-
minded did not arise in a vacuum. As medicine perceived the
possibility of government interventions in medical care in 1912,
medical ethics increasingly stressed professional autonomy and de-
emphasized social obligations.13 This trend was strengthened by events
during World War II, as well-known horrors became strongly
associated with physicians acting as agents of the state.' 4 Add to this
an underlying American predilection towards individual rights and it is
not surprising that, by 1955, the AMA's Code proclaimed that it was
ethically imperative that a "physician... be free to choose whom to
serve and the environment in which to practice."' 15 Indeed, many
medical ethicists urged physicians to completely ignore civic
considerations and consider only the welfare of the individual patient
before them. In 1984, Norman Levinsky wrote, "...physicians are
required to do everything that they believe may benefit each patient,
9 See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
(Basic Books 1982) (documenting this assertion regarding altruism was a broad
theme of the book).
'old.
11 ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONALIsM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY AND POLICY
184-198 (University of Chicago Press 1994) (See Chapter 11: The Centrality of
Professionalism to Health Care).
12 RICHARD CURREY, MEDICINE FOR SALE 32-43 (Grand Rounds Press 1992).
13 William Sage, Physicians as advocates, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1529, 1529-1630 (1999).
14 See Edzard Ernst, Killing in the Name of Healing: The Active Role of the German
Medical Profession During the Third Reich, 100 Am. J. Med. 579, 579-80 (1996);
see also United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Deadly Medicine: Creating the
Master Race, available at
http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/online/deadlymedicine/ (last accessed
August 1, 2005).
15 AMA Code of Medical Ethics §5 (1955), Principle of Medical Ethics, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/upload/mm/369/1957_principles.pdf (last visited Aug.
1,2005).
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without regard to costs or other societal considerations."'1 6 These trends
illustrate the loss of a cardinal role of plysicians as professionals in
mediating private and community interests.17
Originally, medicine was granted professional independence
largely based on its promise to carefully protect the health of patients
and the public. But by the 1960's, physicians came to rely almost solely
on their claims of technical expertise to justify professional
independence because of a societal tilt towards individual autonomy.18
However, while technical skill and knowledge are crucial to medical
care, they are not sufficient to justify monopoly power, self-regulation,
and the other social privileges granted to the medical profession. As
Wynia and Gostin note, since the 1950's medicine has become "bereft
of its role as a social protector, ... left with only technical expertise to
support its claims to professional prerogatives that are granted by
society and which have since steadily eroded."' 19 Indeed, recent
scholars of the medical profession suggest that a civic understanding of
professionalism is necessary to maintain public trust as well as
professional privileges. 20 The turn away from civil obligations may
have led to the birth of bioethics, which was largely founded to enhance
individual rights often against paternalistic physicians.
B. The Emergence of Bioethics
The field of ethical inquiry that forms the foundation for the subject of
bioethics is rooted in philosophy, law, medicine, and other humanities
such as sociology, psychology, and anthropology. Ethics is defined as
the philosophical study of moral values and rules in society to discern
morality and acceptable conduct. 2 1 However, as technology surpassed
16 Norman G. Levinsky, The doctor's master, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1573, 1573-
1575 (1984).
17 M.G. Bloche, Clinical loyalties and the social purposes of medicine, 28 JAMA 268,
268-74 (1999); Matthew K, Wynia, et al., Medical professionalism in society, 341
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1612, 1612-1616 (1999).
18 See David M. Mirvis, Physicians' Autonomy - The Relation Between Public and
Professional Expectations, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1346 (1993).
19 Matthew Wynia and Lawrence Gostin, Ethical challenges in preparing for
bioterrorism: the role of the health care system, 94 AM J PUBLIC HEALTH 1096, 1096-
1102 (2004); William M. Sullivan, What is left of-professionalism after managed
care? 29 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7, 7-13 (1999); and Mark Schlesinger, A loss of
faith: the sources of reduced political legitimacy for the American medical profession,
80 MILBANK Q. 185, 185-235 (2000).
20 Herbert M. Swick, Toward a normative definition of medical professionalism, 75
ACAD. MED. 612, 612-616 (2000); Stephen R. Latham, Medical professionalism: a
Parsonian view, 96 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 363, 363-369 (2002).
21 See generally, ALBERT R. JONSEN, A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2000).
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the social, political, and ethical parameters of human understanding, a
new field of academic discourse was required that encompassed all
facets of the changing face of medicine. This field became bioethics,
the study of value judgments pertaining to human conduct in the area of
biology and those related to the practice of medicine and medical
research.22 Bioethics emerged as a discipline in the early 1970s, but is
believed to date to the Hippocratic Oath and its admonition to "do no
harm. ,"
23
Applied ethics became normative theory and practice as
bioethics evolved and became more broadly applied in medicine, law,
and philosophy. In its basic form, applied ethics seeks to create case
studies, models, or examples that can address or provide a procedural
framework for addressing ethical dilemmas and questions.2 4  The
simplest version of applied ethics involves patient care decisions that
present a conflict of values between decision-makers. This can occur
where an elderly patient has a living will stating she wishes to be
sustained on life support indefinitely regardless of her negative
prognosis or financial stability, and the health care team disagrees. The
common solution to this ethical dilemma is to assemble a health care
ethics team to consult and advise on the best course of action. A
mediated, consensus-building response between competing ethical
values represents-the core of applied ethics.
C. The Principles of Biomedical Ethics
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, in their Principles of Medical
Ethics,25 derive a set of prescriptive standards that legal and medical
professionals may look to for guidance. They identified the principles
of autonomy, 26 beneficence,27 nonmaleficence, 28 and justice, which are
22 See generally A.R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics, 23(6) HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT S1-4 (1993).
23 See Hippocratic Oath, in 1 OXFORD COMPANION TO MED. 545 (Paul B. Beeson et
al. eds., 1986).
24 TL BEAUCHAMP AND IF CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 4 (3d ed.
Oxford University Press 1989).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 121 (Autonomy is generally defined as personal rule of the self that is free
from both controlling interferences by others and from personal limitations that
prevent meaningful choice, such as inadequate understanding. In this sense, consent
is derivative from fundamental notions of autonomy).
27 Id. at 259. (Principles of beneficence demand positive steps to help others to
prevent and remove harm, including positive beneficence and assigning utility and
value. Rules of beneficence include: 1) protecting and defending the rights of others,
2) preventing harm from occurring to others, 3) removing conditions that will cause
harm to others, 4) helping persons with disabilities, 5) rescuing persons in danger).
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relevant to the managed car context. In various practical situations, one
or all of these principles must be weighed against the other, resulting in
a determination based on the balancing of often competing factors. For
instance, justice as a principle requires the equitable and fair
distribution of goods and services, especially medical services and
goods. The ethical principle of justice is achieved through the virtues
of treating similar individuals similarly. Justice, for Beauchamp and
Childress, is not simply individual justice but social justice that can be
divided into three, neither exclusive nor inclusive, levels: national,
institutional, and individual.29
D. Bioethics in Practice: Resource Allocation
Concern about the distribution and allocation of scare medical
resources is a natural outgrowth of the four basic principles of
bioethics. Despite the constant advent of new technologies and medical
procedures, there are simply not enough health care dollars to provide
every procedure and technology for every person who may medically
require them.
Economic models explain scarcity as a function of needs,
demands, and available supply. 3°  In a free market economy, the
balance between scarcity of goods and the supply ideally should fall at
zero, thus the demands for goods or services equals the corresponding
available supply.3 1  When one function is greater than the other,
scarcity is said to exist for either the supply or demand.32 Usually, if
demand is lower, it may be driven by a combination of marketing
practices or tactics designed to encourage consumption. 33  However,
when the scarcity involves the supply of goods or services, it becomes
more difficult to create a zero balance by marketing and regulatory
mechanisms and/or governmental intervention may instead be
required.34
Because the United States' health care system is based on
privatization and free market enterprise for the delivery and
28 Id. at 189 (The principle of nonmaleficence asserts an obligation not to inflict harm
intentionally, such as a duty of care, and may be divisible into four general
obligations: 1) not inflicting evil or harm, 2) prevention of evil or harm, 3) removal
of evil or harm, 4) doing or promoting good).
29 See Beauchamp, supra note 24, at 189.
30 See generally, LES SELPHAKI, ECONOMIC SCARCITY AND HEALTHCARE QUALITY:
TRADEOFFS IN DELINEATION AND DEMARCATION (1997).
31 See id.
32 See id.
13 See id.
34 See id.
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consumption of health care, it should not be surprising that there will
inevitably come a point where the demand for health care services
simply outweighs the supply of available health care finances (i.e., the
total pool of revenue available to pay for all health care services,
procedures, or technologies).
E. Ethics of Managed Care
Corruption and impropriety are common criticisms of the third-party
payor system, particularly in the managed care sector. Various
arguments allege that the underlying economic concept of managed
care provides incentives to withhold care or provide suboptimal care
resulting in inured benefits to the provider of increased reimbursements
or bonuses. This skepticism, coupled with the rise in medical
malpractice litigation, provides fertile ground for various legal
challenges and arguments, culminating in a legacy of countervailing
policy debates and efforts to reform the health care reimbursement
system. Typical MCO efforts to influence the cost-benefit calculus of
health plans include the practice of attempting to curtail the cost of
medical treatment by offering providers financial incentives to limit
costly procedures. However, even more troubling than shortcomings in
health care reimbursement is the financial collapse of managed care
companies and health insurance systems due to large jury verdicts or
non-profitability, leaving more individuals with the dilemma of being
uninsured. Not only do individuals fird it difficult to obtain health
insurance coverage due to costs, but many MCOs are reluctant to
embrace Medicaid program enrollees.
In Rush v. Moran, the United States Supreme Court held that
health plan benefit decisions are not preempted by the Employee
35Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). At issue in this case was
whether an independent medical review was required where a primary
care physician disagreed with the MCO's determination that requested
treatment was not "medically necessary." 36 In ruling against ERISA
preemption, the Court stated that the Illinois Health Maintenance Act
was a law directed specifically toward the insurance industry. " This
determination was significant because not only did it allow Illinois to
retain its ability to regulate managed care entities within its border, but
it also allowed the state to use its statute to force managed care health
plans to accept an independent second opinion before refusing coverage
for certain medical and surgical treatments under ERISA.
35 Rush v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (7h Cir. 2002).
36 Id. at 359-61.
37 See id.
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Unfortunately, despite the passage of two years, reliance on the
principles of medical ethics and the fundamental obligations of
medicine are relegated to secondary status.
The court's decision was also speculated to directly impact the
future viability of current state laws drafted to assist physicians in their
interface with defiant MCOs. Provisions that attempt to prevent
physicians from providing medically necessary treatments to their
patients, such as those provided under ERISA preemption, often force
physicians to behave unethically. In a report in the Journal of the
American medical Association (JAMA), a random national survey of
practicing physicians found that more than 39 percent of physicians
polled stated that within the last year they had exaggerated the severity
of patients' conditions, adjusted a patient's billing diagnosis, or
fabricated patient symptoms in order to secure coverage for a desired
treatment.3
F. Principles of Medical Ethics
As exemplified in the Hippocratic Oath, the foundation of medicine
rests with the historical notions of the physician as healer.39 This code
has been integrated in contemporary form as the American Medical
Association's Code of Medical Ethics.40  However, the commonly
understood goal of medicine, healing and improved health for the
patient, often conflicts with managed care's cost containment
principles. Therefore, the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
(CEJA) sets out various ethical guidelines and opinions within in the
context of managed care regarding restrictions on disclosure in
managed care contracts and financial incentives in the practice of
medicine, with particular emphasis on appropriate patient care not cost-
containment.41 Physicians assume ethical obligations in their care of
patients that should supercede financial, personal, or institutional
42motivations. The treating physician serves as both a steward and
fiduciary for the patient, which often oppose his responsibility to the
38 See Matthew K. Wynia, et al. Physician Manipulation of Reimbursement Rules for
Patients. 283 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1858 (2000).
39 See LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND
INTERPRETATION (1943).
40 See The American Medical Association Code of Ethics 1847, adopted from
THOMAS PERCIVAL, MEDICAL ETHICS, OR A CODE OF INSTITUTES AND PRECEPTS,
ADAPTED TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS (1803).
41 See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 157
(2001) [hereinafter CEJA 2001 ] (Council opinions related to managed care).
42 See id
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community.4 3 This complex relationship frequently produces conflict
and requires further discussion.
1. Fiduciary vs. Stewardship Obligations
A historical background is necessary to provide the context within
which to evaluate the ethical obligations of physicians as professionals
within a managed care organization (MCO). Physicians are said to
serve as quasi-fiduciaries for their patients. 44  As such, they are
ethically, and sometimes legally, obliged to put the interests of patients
above most personal interests, since they serve an important role as
patient advocates.45 This advocacy role becomes especially important
when patients are either not able, or not in a position, to advocate for
themselves due to illness, impoverishment, or social status. Yet
physicians are also stewards of shared resources and protectors of the
public's health. While this tension has long existed between individual
and group responsibilities, managed care has brought it into sharp relief
through the use of strong financial incentives to physicians that serve as
more conservative stewards. For example, managed care policies
aimed at discouraging physicians from informing patients about
services not covered, known as "gag clauses," were strongly opposed
by physicians and patients who believed it unethical and contrary to a
physician's fiduciary role withhold information from patients.
46
Similarly, early capitation payment schemes were criticized for
providing too great a financial incentive for physicians to skimp on
care.
4 7
2. Consumerism vs. Limits of Contractual Justice
Consumerism is another important theme in managed care.
Consumerism asserts that "the possession and use of an increasing
number and variety of goods and services is the principal cultural
aspiration and the surest perceived route to personal happiness, social
43 See generally Edmund D. Pellegrino, Societal Duty and Moral Complicity: The
Physician's Dilemma of Divided Loyalty, 16 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 371 (1993).
44 Marc Rodwin helpfully notes that while physicians often espouse a "fiduciary
ethic," they are not often held to legal fiduciary standards, especially regarding the
proscription of most financial conflicts of interest. Hence, the use of the term "quasi-
fiduciary." See MARC RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS'
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (Oxford University Press 1993).
41 See id
46 See David S. Kaplan, Managed care: Gag clauses and doctor-patient
communication: State responses, 25(2-3) J Law Med Ethics 213-18 (1997).
47 See Matthew K. Wynia, The Oregon Capitation Initiative: Lessons and Warnings,
from the Forefront of the Backlash, 276 JAMA 1441, 1441-1444 (1996).
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status and national success. ' 4 8 As consumers demand more services,
healthcare cost rises exponentially. This leads to the formulation of cost
containment measures to offset these costs. Although these cost-
containment measures are enacted to protect the financial health of
managed care entities, they can have the unfortunate effect of
restricting needed healthcare services and creating claims for contract
violation.49
In an idealized market-based and consumer-driven health care
system, MCO enrollees are viewed as rational economic actors capable
of making reasonable choices regarding health insurance coverage and
living with their consequences. To foster rational choice, enrollees are
given information about prices and quality. Unfortunately the results
are not always ideal because most people do not use this information;
are not given meaningful choices between various health plan
offerings; have difficulty anticipating their medical needs; or simply
cannot afford to purchase health insurance in the first place. Partly for
these reasons, many physicians find it appropriate to treat those in their
care as vulnerable patients rather than informed healthcare consumers.
Problems arise, however, when a patient's health plan does not cover a
service that a physician believes her patient needs. If health insurance
is perceived as a normal good in a typical market, a consumer who
purchases an insurance contract that does not cover a service must live
or die with this decision, literally and figuratively, regardless of its
importance to her well being. To draw a corollary to the automobile
insurance industry, no automobile insurer would cover the costs of
replacing a car in a liability-only policy simply because a person
desperately needs transportation. Physicians, however, are
uncomfortable dispensing, or enforcing, such harsh contractual justice
in medical care. Thus, some physicians report manipulating
reimbursement rules for patients rather than telling them they cannot
have, or must pay out of pocket for, medically necessary but uncovered
medical services. 50  In a national survey of physicians, 31 percent
48 See ALAN THIEN DURNNG, How MUCH Is ENOUGH? THE CONSUMER SOCIETY
AND THE FUTURE OF THE EARTH 34 (1992) (quoting British economist Paul Ekins,
The Sustainable Consumer Society: A Contradiction in Terms?, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, Fall 1991).
49 See Harold S. Luft, Why Are Physicians So Upset About Managed Care?, 24 J.
POL., POL'Y & L. 957, 962-63 (1999); see also Joseph B. Treaster, Aetna Agreement
with Doctors Envisions Altered Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2003, at Al.
50 See generally, Matthew Wynia, et al., Physician Manipulation of Reimbursement
Rules for Patients: Between A Rock and A Hard Place, 283 JAMA 1858, 1858-1865
(2000); see also Matthew Wynia, et al., Do Physicians Not Offer Useful Services
Because of Coverage Restrictions? 22 Health Affairs 190 (2003); see also Matthew
2005]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
reported having sometimes not offered their patients useful services
because of perceived coverage restrictions.51 Of these physicians, 35
percent reported taking this approach more frequently in 1998-99 than
they had in the past, which suggests a rising trend. 2 Though
physicians have an ethical obligation to discuss all medically
appropriate services with patients, empirical data demonstrates that
coverage restrictions in health plans may make such discussions
difficult.53
Therefore, it is imperative that the relationship between
physicians, patients, and the managed care organization is clearly
identified and explored. The nature and extent of such relationships
may be material in drafting comprehensive contracts, agreements, and
in controversies concerning remuneration for managed care services.
G. The Intersection of Ethics and Managed Care
Within the context of managed care, the concepts of informed consent
and financial conflicts of interest fall within the purview of medical
ethics.
1. Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent is recognized in legal and medical
traditions as "every human being of adult years and sound mind
[having] the right to determine what shall be done with his own
body., 54 This doctrine has been expanded to include a duty of due care
to inform the patient of both material and relevant information,
especially information that pertains to risks that are explicit or inherent
in the proposed therapy.5 5 By emphasizing patient rights, informed
consent litigation transformed the existing profession-based standard
into a patient-based standard, and finders of fact were asked to
Wynia, When the quantity of mercy is strained: US physicians' deception of insurers
for patients, in MALINGERING AND ILLNESS DECEPTION (Halligan et al. eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 2003).
51 Wynia Health Affairs, supra note 50.
52 Id. at 194.
53 id.
54 See Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (Ct.
App. 1914).
55 See Informed Consent, available at http://www.ama-
assn.orR/ama/pub/categorv/4608.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
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determine whether a patient was adequately informed about matters
relating to her healthcare choice.5 6 As one court recognized:
[T]rue consent ... is the informed exercise of a choice, and
that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options
available and the risks attendant upon each... [thus] springs the need,
and in turn the requirement, of a reasonable divulgence by [a]
physician to [a] patient to make such a decision possible.5 7
Managed care creates conflict within informed consent because the
financial priorities of a managed care organization and/or treating
physician may shadow, infringe, or unduly influence the patient's
"informed decision."
2.Financial Conflicts of Interest
Financial incentives are generally classified as tools, techniques, or
mechanisms used by physicians or group practices to manage and/or
control healthcare costs. These incentives may include items such as
shared risk pools, where the insurance company or provider sets the
amount or limit they will pay per patient pool and a patient's care is
derived from that general risk pool, or capitation plans, where the
insurance company or provider sets a fixed amount per patient per year
and any medical treatment costs above or below that amount are either
liabilities or assets for the physician/provider.
Practicing medicine involves accepting the rule that "a patient's
reliance upon the physician ... traditionally has exacted obligations
beyond those associated with arms length transactions." 58 Physicians
have both an ethical and a legal responsibility to satisfy the patient's
vital need for information regarding her therapy. 59 However, managed
care operates by focusing on the bottom line, a business plan that
contradicts the fundamental nature of informed consent and patient
care.
In 1998, a New England Journal of Medicine study found that
nearly 40 percent of primary care physicians affiliated with managed
care organizations in urban California were aware of financial
56 See Michelle Mello, et al., The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research, 139
ANN. INTERN. MED. 40 (2003) (citing TROYEN BRENNAN, JUST DOCTORING:
MEDICAL ETHICS IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991).
57 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (1972).
58 See Canterbury, 464 F. 2d at 782.
59 See CEJA 2001, supra note 41, at 165 (ethical obligation of informed consent); see
also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782 (holding a legal obligation imposed upon physicians
for informed consent).
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incentives. Furthermore, approximately "half [of] these physicians
indicated that such incentives depended on their performance in
retraining the use of referrals or hospital services." 61 "Empirical data
or survey data raise concerns regarding the extent to which financial
incentives appear to influence physicians' experiences of undesirable
pressure in their practices. ' 62 The suggestion is that bonuses based on
limiting referrals or increased patient "productivity heighten[s]
physicians' 'performance anxiety' and their perception that care may be
compromised., 63  Since financial schemes can compromise medical
ethics, the American Medical Association's policy-making bodies and
processes have issued guidance on the topic of physician ethics and
financial incentives. AMA CEJA Opinion 8.054 specifically comments
that physicians "should evaluate the financial incentives associated
with participation in health plans before contracting with that plan.",
64
Although a plan's incentives may range from monetary payments to
flat bonuses paid to physicians, ethical concerns are raised where a
physician may be motivated to withhold care for covered services in
order to retain that windfall.
Pursuant to various state statutory schemes, most states now
impose upon HMOs an ethical duty to disclose financial incentive
schemes that may impair patient care or treatment decisions. 6
5
Although it is generally difficult to plead breach of fiduciary duty for
66adverse benefits decisions, some courts recognize that a plaintiff may
state a cause of action, under ERISA, against an HMO that fails to
disclose physician incentives schemes. Specifically, the Eighth
Circuit in Shea v. Esensten noted that "ERISA should not be construed
to permit the fiduciary to circumvent [its] ERISA-imposed fiduciary
duty in this manner., 68 The court found that a physician's financial
60 See Kevin Grumbach, et al., Primary Care Physicians' Experience of Financial
Incentives in Managed-Care Systems, 339 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1516 (1998).
61 Id. at 1520
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See CEJA 2001, supra note 41, at 157.
65 See, e.g., Illinois Managed Care Act, 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 134/15(b) (1999).
(currently, 42 states have passed some form of legislation involving HMO or
managed care regulations).
66 See, e.g., Neades v. Portes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 445, 739 N.E.2d 496, 503 (2000).
67 See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that if a fiduciary
alleges that an ERISA violation caused a former employee to lose plan participant
status, then standing is established to challenge that fiduciary violation).
68 Id. at 628 (noting that in this case, but for the health plan's failure to disclose the
physician's financial interest in discouraging specialty referrals, the plaintiffs
husband would be alive and a plan participant).
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arrangement is material information on which a patient relies, and the
patient must be able to know if her physician's advice is influenced b6y
self-serving considerations created by the health insurance provider.
Thus, a claim for breach of ERISA fiduciary duty exists when a health
plan fails to disclose all material facts affecting a beneficiary's health
care interests, including payment incentives.
70
H. Utilization Review and Medical Necessity
As part of cost-containment techniques, only those procedures that
meet contractual definitions of "medical necessity" will be covered in
managed care. Legal challenges involving questions of medical
necessity typically require a clearly demarcated distinction between
ERISA preempted claims and traditional state law claims of medical
malpractice. 71
In Pegram v. Herdrich, Pegram appealed a 7 Circuit decision
that found Herdrich's argument that the HMO and its physician
violated their ERISA-imposed fiduciary duty by delaying her medical
treatment in order to increase their incentive bonuses to be without
merit.72 Cynthia Herdrich presented to her physician, Dr. Lori Pegram,
for evaluation of sharp left groin pain. Physical examination revealed a
swollen mass, but Dr. Pegram declined to order an ultrasound since the
nearest hospital where this diagnostic study could be done was not
within the HMO network. Herdrich subsequently suffered a ruptured
appendix with attendant bowel infection. 73 In finding for the HMO, the
Court rejected the assertion that an HMO structure that provided an
inherent financial incentive to limit patient care breached the plan's
fiduciary duty to its beneficiaries. 74  The Supreme Court identified
three categories of managed care decisions: 1) pure eligibility; 75 2)
69 See id.
70 Id. at 629 ("we believe Mrs. Shea has stated a claim against Medica for breaching
the fiduciary obligation to disclose all the material facts affecting her husband's health
care interests. When an HMO's financial incentives discourage a treating doctor from
providing essential health care referrals for conditions covered under the plan benefit
structure, the incentives must be disclosed and the failure to do so is a breach of
ERISA's fiduciary duties").
71 See, e.g., Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 99, 2003 U.S. App LEXIS 2925 (2d Cir.
2003).
72 See Pegram v. Hedrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000).
71 Id. at 2145.
74 Id. at 2158.
75 Pure eligibility decisions are conditions directly covered by the plan that are clearly
subject to ERISA preemption. Id. at 2154-55.
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medical treatment decisions; 76 and 3) mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions.77 The Court was unwilling to allow ERISA to apply to a suit
involving mixed eligibility and treatment decisions since such suits had
existing applicable remedies in state court.
The decision in Cicio v. Vytra Healthcare follows the same
logic. Here, the plaintiffs ERISA claims were joined with allegations
of negligent medical decision-making. 78 The plaintiff argued that her
medical malpractice claims were not preempted by ERISA because
they concerned "mixed eligibility and treatment decisions," as
described in Pegram.79 The Second Circuit agreed that. the plaintiffs
claim was not preempted by ERISA, reasoning that the plaintiff had
"alleged that the defendants made a decision that could implicate a state
law duty concerning the quality of medical decision-making, in
addition to and independent of her claims concerning the administration
of benefits with respect to her late husband's course of care."
80
Applying the ethical considerations of justice, fairness, and
beneficence to the utilization review process-will yield optimal benefit
ratios and marginal cost for the patient, provider, and insurer.
However, HMOs make mixed eligibility and treatment decisions that
are often based on biased opinions. These decisions favor the health
plan with cost-benefits displaced toward cost-containment and
upholding broad-scale utilitarianism and operational effectiveness of
the plan, i.e. providing less comprehensive and sophisticated plans for
more people, to the detriment of individual patient autonomy, fairness,
and individual choice. An awareness of the contributing factors to
litigation (including, denial of services, delay in approving services and
failure to refer emergency cases outside of health plan network) of
adverse managed care decisions is both prudent and necessary. In a
mixed eligibility and treatment decision, focus should be directed to the
ethical component of "quality of care,' not "quantity of care."82 This
76 Medical treatment decisions involve diagnosing the patient's condition and
deciding on management, subject to state malpractice theories. Id.
77 Mixed eligibility and treatment. decisions occur when coverage and medical
judgment determinations are intertwined and may be subject to either state law or
ERISA preemption. Id.
78 See Cicio, 321 F.3d 83.
79 Id. at 101 (citing Pegram, 120 S. Ct. 2154, 530 U.S. 229).
80 Id. at 91-92.
81 Quality of care is the degree to which health services for individuals and
populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with
current professional knowledge. Crossing the Quality Chasm: The IOM Health Care
Quality Initiative, available at http://www.iom.edu/focuson.asp?id=8089 (last visited
Aug. 1, 2005).
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shifts attention away from issues of physician/practitioner negligence
and avoids the problem of ERISA preemption. To help illustrate this
distinction, consider the claim that health plans commit negligence by
instituting financial incentives that induce medical malpractice by
plaintiffs health care providers. Many MCOs offer bonuses to
physicians in order to encourage efficiency through use of "utilization
management" guidelines, which aim at keeping use of health care
services by both physicians and patients within prescribed parameters.
Although treatment decisions involve medical decisions by physicians,
directing our attention to just the medical profession ignores the role of
the health care company in managed care.
1. Safe Medical Care and ERISA
Courts recognize the ethical and legal dilemmas when physicians make
mixed treatment and health insurance eligibility decisions. One
specific area of overlap between ethical and legal dilemmas exists in
83certain emergency situations.
In Pappas v. Asbel II, the court reconsidered its earlier decision
in light of the US Supreme Court decision of Pegram v. Herdrich. The
plaintiff-patient ("Pappas") was admitted to a Pennsylvania community
hospital emergency room at 1 1 am complaining of paralysis and
numbness in his extremities.84 The emergency room physician
concluded that the plaintiff was suffering from an epidural abscess on
the spinal column, a condition that constituted a neurological
emergency.85  The emergency room physician immediately made
arrangements for transfer to a university hospital, but when the
ambulance arrived at 12:40 pm the physician received notice that the
health insurance company was denying authorization for treatment at
Jefferson University Hospital. 86 The health insurance company then
notified the physician that Pappas could be transferred to three other
university hospitals.87 But by the time the physician contacted Medical
College of Pennsylvania, a hospital that agreed to accept transfer of the
82 See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3rd Cir. 1995) (Federal courts
have consistently used a "quantity" versus "quality" analysis to determine if a claim
is completely preempted by ERISA; quantity of care diverts the focus from a patient-
centered context to a contractual and legally defined one, thus implicating health
insurance implementation and administration as areas preempted by ERISA).
83 See Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa. 407, 419 (Penn. 2001).84 Id. at 410.
85 See id
16Id. at 410-11.
87 Id. at 411.
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patient, three hours had passed.88 Pappas now suffers from permanent
quadriplegia resulting from compression of his spine by the abscess.
89
Plaintiff Pappas sued the community hospital and his primary care
physician alleging medical malpractice and hospital negligence in
causing an "inordinate delay in transferring him to a facility equipped
and immediately available to handle the emergency. ' 9°  The
community hospital subsequently filed a third-party complaint against
the health insurance company, joining it as a defendant for its refusal to
authorize the transfer of Pappas to the hospital selected by the
emergency room physician. In addition, the primary care physician
filed a cross-claim against the health insurance company for
contribution and indemnity.
The issue before the Court in Pappas II was whether ERISA
preempted the state law claim of medical malpractice. The Court,
looking to Pegram, noted that the Supreme Court set forth two guiding
principles for ERISA preemption in state law medical malpractice
cases. The first is that HMO physicians occupy dual roles: they act
like plan administrators when determining if a patient's condition is
covered, and like health care providers when deciding upon the
medical treatment a participant will receive. 92  Second, HMO
physicians make three types of decisions: pure eligibility, treatment
decisions, and mixed eligibility and treatment decisions. 93 The Court
noted that negligence claims are not governed by ERISA provisions
when a "defendant's allegedly dilatory delivery of contractually-
guaranteed medical benefits were intertwined with the question of safe
medical care" because "Congress did not intend to preempt State law
aimed at regulating health care." 94  Here, the emergency room
physician immediately determined an appropriate transfer facility, but
the HMO did not approve. The emergency room physician then
telephoned the HMO for reconsideration and emphasized that this was
a neurological emergency that required immediate attention, but still
the referral was denied. Although the health insurance com any
attempted to classify this as a "quintessential coverage decision," the
Court held that the case involved a mixed eligibility and treatment
88 See id.
89 Pappas, 564 Pa. at 411.
90 Id. at 411.
9' Id. at 415.
92 See id (citing Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2153-54).
9' Id. at 413.
94 Pappas, 564 Pa. at 415.
9' Id. at 419.
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decision, which, under Pegram, may be properly redressed through
state medical malpractice law.
96
2. Medical Necessity as Preempted by ERISA
In contrast to Pappas, in Calad v. Cigna Healthcare a Texas Court
concluded that an HMO's strict adherence to existing medical necessity
criteria was a consideration completely preempted by ERISA, despite
injury to the patient/insured member.97 In Calad, patients brought state
claims against their HMO under the Texas Health Care Liability Act
(THCLA), which allowed patients to sue their heath plans if the patient
was injured because a plan denied coverage for medical care. Calad
had been informed during pre-authorization and coverage procedures
that CIGNA only authorized one day of hospitalization following her
scheduled hysterectomy surgery. On the second day following surgery,
Calad's treating physician was told to discharge her if she did not have
hemorrhaging, fever, or high blood pressure; she could only extend her
stay if she assumed the cost.98 Unable to incur the personal expense of
a longer hospital stay, Calad went home on the second day post
surgery.99 She alleged that Cigna HMO "failed to use ordinary care in
influencing, controlling, participating, and making medically necessary
decisions which affected the quality of the diagnosis, care, and
treatment provided to plaintiffs."'' 0 Plaintiffs specifically alleged that
defendants had a calculated scheme to increase profits by adversely
affecting medical care for patients through HMO medical necessity
decision-making, thereby wrongfully interfering with the
recommendations of plaintiffs' treating physicians. 01
The Calad Court recognized that medical -necessity and
utilization review serve as the crossover between pure coverage claims
and state law quality of care claims. 10 2 At issue was whether ERISA
preemption applied when a plaintiff sues her HMO, not the ERISA plan
itself, and when the utilization review function is performed by HMO
personnel rather than a third party entity. Calad brought a cause of
action solely under the THCLA, expressly denying recovery of benefits
under her ERISA plan. The Court held that Plaintiff Calad made a
96 Id. at 419-20.
97 Calad v. Cigna Healthcare, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8538 at *19 (N.D. Tex. 2001)
(holding that plaintiff's challenge to quantity of care received as a result of utilization
review was completely preempted by ERISA).
" See id. at *10.
99 See id.
100 Id. at *3.
101 See id.
112 Calad, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8538 at *8.
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quality of care claim against her HMO, which is completely preempted
by ERISA.'° 3 The Fifth Circuit employed a two-step ERISA analysis,
"considering first whether a claim is subject to ordinary preemption,"
and "then whether the claim falls within the" civil enforcement
mechanisms for denial of benefits and coverage determination
decisions. 10 4 As with several other jurisdictions, "claims challenging
health care treatment decisions or the quality of care fall within the
realm of [state law] negligence and medical malpractice."',0 5 Relying
on Pegram, plaintiff attempted to argue that Cigna's determination was
a "mixed medical decision" beyond the purview of ERISA preemption.
However, the Court held that "Pegram does not require that every
conceivable state law claim survives preemption so long as it is based
on a mixed question of eligibility and treatment."
10 6
I. Physician Actions: Malpractice or ERISA Preemption
As the above cases demonstrate, ERISA preemption and federal law is
invoked when alleging negligent adherence to "medically necessary"
criteria or improper utilization review. However, if an issue of
malpractice exists, courts should examine the ethical duties of
physicians in the delivery of the quality and/or type of care for that
patient. For example, the facts in Pappas indicate that the emergency
room physician acted within prescribed ethical guidelines. 10 7 The
physician made an appropriate medical assessment of the emergency
medical condition, initiated and completed a transfer to a specialty
hospital, and further advocated on behalf of the patient when the health
insurance company denied transfer to that particular hospital. l'0 It is,
however, somewhat incongruous when a physician's ethical obligations
to advocate and provide the best care and options for the patient
translates into spending hours convincing managed care to effect a
transfer, particularly when time is of the essence.
In contrast, Calad represents a failed attempt to directly sue an
HMO for administrative and utilization review pursuant to a Texas law
permitting negligence and quality of care suits against HMOs. Here,
the treating physician was subject to an HMO administrative
determination that found Calad ineligible for additional hospital
inpatient stay based on her medical condition and criteria. Although
"03 Id. at *9.
104 Id. at *8.
'o' Id. at *9.
106 Id. at *14.
107 Pappas, 564 Pa. at 410-11.
108 See id.
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forcing a patient to leave a hospital within one day of fairly invasive
surgery appears indicative of negligence and poor quality of care, the
Court in Calad clearly demarcated that most, if not all, treatment
review, eligibility, and utilization review activities remained within the
purview of ERISA preemption.1°9 Therefore, despite a physician's
duties and ethical obligations to the patient, which may include
extending that patient's hospital stay, the physician is still subject to the
rigorous scrutiny of utilization review and managed care limitations. "
0
J. Illustrative Cases
By analyzing each of the above legal issues within an ethical
framework, various strategies and practical frameworks emerge that
may be useful for a wide array of individuals."' Two recent United
States Supreme Court cases illustrate how the above legal issues in
managed care are infused with ethical themes and frequently become
factors in benefit determination decisions.
1. Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran
The U.S. Supreme Court held that ERISA does not preempt provisions
of the Illinois HMO Act, and that a health plan's failure to provide
independent medical review (availability for a non-plan health care
provider to review the determination of medically necessary care) is a
justiciable cause of action.112 In Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, the
beneficiary-insured sought a physician-recommended surgical that was
materially different from the surgical procedure that her HMO would
cover as medically necessary. 113 This difference of opinion suggests
that the common ethical approach of balancing the patient's autonomy,
quality of life predictors, outcomes, and transparency of the process,
may have produced materially different outcomes. One of the goals of
ethics in practice is to benchmark or determine ideal outcomes for the
patient and the physician based on a theoretically mutual collaboration
in the decision-making process. Thus, in Moran, perhaps direct
109 Calad, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8538 at *21.
:: Pappas, 564 Pa. at 418-20.
1 As a general matter, the intersection of managed care, medical ethics, and legal
ethics is relevant to practicing attorneys, litigators, in-house counsel, policy analysts,
political decision-makers, and health insurance providers. Each stakeholder must be
aware and accountable for his or her actions and justifications. Such obligations are
grounded in ethical principles, as well as increasing legal liability circumstances.
11 See Rush, 536 U.S. 355 (2002). (For a more detailed discussion on the intricate
legal and health law issues involved with the Moran case, see other sections of this
chapter.).
13 Id. at 360-61.
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communication between the health insurance plan and the patient,
clearly articulated educational materials, or discussions between
plaintiff and her physician to discuss prognosis and treatments, may
have avoided protracted litigation.
2. Black and Decker Disability Plan v. Nord
In Black and Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, the Supreme Court
analyzed another ethical theory -- whether physicians should provide
continuity of care.' 14 In Nord, the Court held that the treating physician
rule (a professional deference to the physician who first treats the
patient) is inapplicable to ERISA determinations for disability
benefits. 115  Under ERISA, the employers design the plan, the
employees accept the plan, and a contractual situation is formed. The
Court held that the treating physician rule, which provided professional
deference to the medical opinion of the first physician to treat a patient,
would be difficult to administer due to the variability and diversity of
judicial interpretation of each case and is therefore inapplicable to
ERISA disability benefits determinations. 116 In contrast, the treating
physician rule is applicable under the Social Security plan because it is
a national, federal-funded benefits plan adjudicated by an
administrative law judge (ALJ) that requires uniformity. It is
appropriate because ALJs can interpret it in a consistent manner subject
to specific guidelines and not to the variabilities inherent in differing
federal jurisdictions that hear potential ERISA claims." 7
The Nord case exemplifies the tension between traditional
notions of medical ethics, deference to the physician's decisions
regarding diagnosis and management, and the integration of medical
practice into legal interpretations of benefit determinations. As a
practical ethical value in all benefit or managed care situations, it may
be appropriate for courts to adopt policy positions based on generalized
and consistent administrability to comport with notions of fairness and
justice. This may result in greater uniformity and predictability in court
decisions.
K. Fairness in Coverage Decisions
114 See generally Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003).
"5 Id. at 828-31 (holding that no heightened evidentiary standard exists and that the
proper guidance is to follow interpretation of the terms of the plan or contract
language. A distinction was thus made between Social Security determinations that
"give more weight to medical opinions from treating sources.").
116 id. at 831.
117 See id.
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The complexities of managed care litigation involve, inter alia,
interpretation of plan language and the dichotomy between benefit
determination decisions and medical necessity. Education and
elucidation of these distinctions must continue to occur within the legal
environment. Improving or establishing a sense of fairness in coverage
decisions is a lofty goal for many stakeholders in the managed care
system. One collaborative group comprised of health care executives,
physicians, nurses, and insurance companies, 118 has developed a
comprehensive framework that highlights and builds upon the ethical
principles of fairness, justice, and beneficence.11 9 The group has
identified five content areas 120 for designing and administering health
care benefits, and recommend the process be: participatory,
compassionate, equitable and consistent, sensitive to value, and
transparent. 12 1 Such an ethical approach, when applied to a factual
situation such as that in Moran, might produce a materially different
outcome since attention might have been devoted to discussing the
procedures covered and the treatment decision with the patient, rather
than utilizing a formalistic and mechanic appeals process. In any event,
as managed care litigation continues to develop, it is worth
acknowledging that a consensus of key participants suggests that a
systems-approach to recognizing common criticisms and concerns that
integrates the expectations of all stakeholders may yield a more
legitimate health care financing system with an increased perception of
fairness.
The intersection between managed care, medical ethics, and the
law is established by a myriad of competing, yet important, factors.
When dealing with the managed care environment, it is important to
realize that medical ethics, physician ethics, and the health care system
must be unified in all evolving discussions.
III. PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS: THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN
MEDICAL ETHICS AND LEGAL ETHICS IN MANAGED CARE
118 AMA Institute for Ethics, Ethical Force ProgramTM  , at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/3592.htm (restricted to AMA members).
119 Id.
120 These content areas were developed after an extensive review of literature, various
meetings and intricate ranking and voting procedures. See Matthew Wynia et al.,
Improving Fairness in Coverage Decisions: Performance Expectations for Quality
Improvement, 4(3) AM. J. BIOETHICS 87 (2004).
121 id.
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The word "ethics" derives from the Greek word "ethos," meaning
character.12 2 The Hippocratic Oath embraces this "ethos," and
establishes a number of fundamental principles that form the skeleton
of the medical profession which remain true in contemporary
society. 123 Unfortunately, the advent of managed care organizations and
their burgeoning growth has eroded the cloistered relationship
traditionally enjoyed between patients and physicians and has shaken
the very foundation of this Oath. The relationship is no longer
restricted to the patient and the physician, it has now been enlarged to
embrace administrators and operators of these health plans.
A. American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical
Ethics
The medical profession prides itself on adhering to the highest
standards of professional conduct. Recently, however, its ethics have
been scrutinized as physicians in increasing numbers have moved from
being self-employed to being employees of managed health care
entities. This disconcerting alliance between physicians and managed
care organizations has raised various ethical concerns and has forced
the AMA to revise its code of medical ethics. Within the code, the
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA), the body that interprets
and references the principles, has outlined seven aspirational principles
and ninety-one "Opinions. ' 24 Although only 28% of physicians in the
United States are members of the American Medical Association
(AMA), every physician is subject to its code of ethics. 125 The AMA,
through CEJA, mandates that the physician's ethical duty should not be
influenced by his place of employment. 26 CEJA Opinion 5.01 notes,
122  ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1103al5-b25 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
123 Judith Areen et al., Hippocratic Oath, LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 273 (1984)
("I will keep them from harm and injustice").
124 AMA Principles of Medical Ethics and Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs (1989) reprinted in Codes of Professional Responsibility 189-221
(R. Gorlin 2d ed. 1990).
125 Stokely Baksh, AMA gets facelifit to attract new members, (Jun. 22, 2005)
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/upi/20050616-033709-7222r.htm (last
visited August 1, 2005) (quoting AMA executive vice president and chief executive
officer, Dr. Michael D. Maves, "AMA membership has been declining since the
1960s"); see generally AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH
ANNOTATIONS 2004-2005 EDITION (AMA Press 2004) [hereinafter CEJA 2005].
26 See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 129
(AMA Press 1996) [hereinafter CEJA 1996].
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"Physicians practicing in prepaid plans or managed care organizations
are subject to the same ethical principles as are other physicians. 127
According to these overriding principles, the interests of the patient
supercede those of the physician. 128  Still, managed care entities
generally expect physicians to have dual, but competing, loyalties to
the patient and to the MCO. This dual role creates conflict-ridden
tension between the physician and the patient that further erodes the
patient-physician relationship and may negatively impact
treatment/benefit decisions.
This expansion of financial incentives within the managed care
industry also motivated the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs to issue Opinion 8.13 in 1996.129 This declared financial
incentives to be ethically permissible "only if they promote the cost-
effective delivery of health care and not the withholding of medically
necessary care." 13 0 The AMA stressed the importance of full disclosure
of financial incentives to potential enrollees not just before enrollment
in a MCO, but also every year post-enrollment. Additionally, CEJA
underscored the importance of limiting the scope of financial incentives
and aligning the economic consequences of these incentives with the
practice patterns of large physician groups rather than with individual
physicians because individual physician treatment decisions may not be
sufficient to delineate patterns of care.
132
B. American College of Physicians (ACP) Ethics Manual
Prior to the advent of managed care organizations, individual
physicians not only made diagnostic and therapeutic decisions, but also
assumed responsibility for those decisions. However, with the
proliferation of managed care entities, that traditional relationship
between physician and patient now occurs within parameters
established by MCO administrative brokers.
1 33
One of the policies of the American College of Physicians-
American Society of Internal Medicine (ACP-ASIM) is to promote
127 See id.
128 See id at 105 ("Under no circumstances may physicians place their own financial
interests above the welfare of their patients."); see also id. at 126 (In a managed care
system, "physicians must continue to place the interests of their patients first.").
129 CEJA 1996, supra note 127, at 72.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See id. at 128.
133 See generally Clifton B. Perry, Conflicts of Interest and the Physician's Duty to
Inform. 96(4) AM. J. of MED. 375 (1994); see generally SM Wolf, Health Care
Reform and the Future of Physician Ethics. Hastings Center Report 26-41 (1994).
2005]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
high ethical standards for physicians and managed care organizations.
Accordingly, the ACP-ASIM developed its Ethics Manual to encourage
physicians to promote their patients' welfare and make the physician-
patient relationship central to patient care. 134 Mirroring the AMA's
Code of Medical Ethics, the ACP-ASIM's Ethics Manual encourages
resisting the temptation to base medical treatment on financial
incentives rather than medical merit and scientific evidence.
1 35
The Ethics Manual specifically intended to facilitate the process
of making ethical decisions in clinical practice and medical research. It
explains how medicine must take a proactive approach to regulate
physicians because the ethics and positive duties established by law
oftentimes lags behind professional ethics. 136 In its most recent fourth
edition, the Ethics Manual includes a specific section entitled "The
Ethics of Practice" and discusses pertinent managed care topics,
including the changing practice environment, financial arrangements,
financial conflicts of interest, and advertising. 137  In addition, the
Manual directs physicians to promote their patients' welfare by
managing conflicts of interest and ensuring stewardship of health care
resources so that finite resources can meet as many health care needs as
possible. 138 It emphasizes that the "patient-physician relationship and
[its] governing principles should be central to the delivery of
care.. .physicians must not allow financial considerations to affect their
clinical judgment or counseling, including referrals for the patient. 139
This discussion is striking because the ethical guidance is
recommended while recognizing that a patient's preferences or interests
may conflict with the motivations of the physician, institution, payor,
or other member of a managed care plan. The physician must also
contribute to the responsible stewardship of health care resources by
disclosing any conflicts of interest and providing all necessary
information and counsel for patients regarding treatment options and
referrals. And finally, the Manual encourages physicians to be
conscious of all potential influences and to guide actions by appropriate
utilization while promoting the provision of services to uninsured and
underinsured patients. 1
40
134 See American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 3rd ed., 117 ANN. INT. MED.
947 (1992).
135 See generally id
136 See id.
137 Id. at 587-87.
138 Id. at 586.
139 id.
140 See generally American College of Physicians Ethical Manual, supra note 134.
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C. The Physician and the Managed Care Contract
Due to considerable structural and content changes in the health care
financing and delivery system, the relationship between physicians and
managed care organizations is in a state of constant flux. In fact, courts
must now become "increasingly aware of complex economic
arrangements in order to discern the nature of the organization and to
frame the relevance of the pending legal issues."1 41 The following is a
brief discussion of the conflicts, challenges, and liabilities for
physicians within the managed care environment. Particularly
interesting is the observation regarding heightened judicial attention to
scrutinizing and interpreting managed care contracts - adding a further
complexity to identifying clear boundaries of physicians' ethical and
professional obligations.
1. Conflict and the Contract
A contract denotes a meeting of minds, as commonly referred to the
,,142phrase "manifestation of mutual assent.' But as an increasing
numbers of conflicts arise within the managed care setting, traditional
contract principles are ignored while resolution is sought in the courts.
The relationship between physician credentialing, exclusive physician
contracts, and professional competence has long been a subject of
health care and managed care litigation. 143 For example, physicians are
sometimes forced to litigate against their health plans when they
believe their ethical duty to their patients is seriously compromised by
contractual provisions.
In Grossman v. Columbine Medical Group, a physician
challenged a service agreement contract drafted by a health insurer and
the medical group with which he was affiliated.1 44 Grossman alleged
141 See E.H. Morreim, Confusion in the Courts: Managed Care Financial Structures
and Their Impact on Medical Care, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 699 (2000) (citing Petrovich
v. Share Health Plan of IL, 719 N.E.2d 756, 763 (1999)).
142 See Restatement of Contracts, 2d, § 20 (Requirement of manifestation of mutual
assent).
143 For a general overview, see John D. Blum, The Evolution of
Physician Credentialing in Managed Care Contracting, 22 AM. J.
LAW AND MED. 173 (1996) (detailing the evolution and practical
implications on the hospital credentialing process and exclusive
physician contracts with managed care plans designed to create
arrangements with particular physician networks. Also noting the
growing body of case law on exclusive physician contracts and the
issue of medical staff privileges and professional competence).
144 See Grossman v. Columbine Medical Group, 12 P.3d 269, 273 (Colo.App. 1999).
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that the "termination without cause provision in the physician service
contract was void as against public policy due to its negative impact on
the physician-patient relationship and disruption of the continuity of
patient care.' ' 145 Although recognizing the importance of maintaining
stability in physician-patient relationships, the Court held that the
clause cannot be against public policy because the Colorado legislature
permits termination clauses in contracts between physicians and health
care providers. 146 The Grossman Court focused on the fact that the
termination clause expressly sets forth the right of both parties to
terminate the contract at-will; therefore the physician service agreement
was valid. 1
47
Despite the result, this decision raises an interesting issue as to
the ethical obligations of physicians: Are physician-employees, subject
to service or payment contracts, obligated to accept terms as written
regardless of the negative implications on patient care? 148  Future
challenges by physicians to the language contained in managed care
contracts will likely offer additional insight into the scope and
implications of competing ethical obligations.
3. Physicians May Challenge Managed Care
for Malpractice Issues
Physicians are also willing to sue health insurance providers when
malpractice claims arise, as seen in Pappas. 149 The AMA and state
medical associations have challenged the Aetna/U.S. Healthcare
physician contract for lack of transparency. The challenge was based
on grounds that it gives the company unilateral authority to change
material terms of the contract and to make determinations of medical
necessity. 150 The AMA perceives physicians' bargaining power as
restricted and some of their contracts as being akin to adhesion
145 id.
146 id.
147 id.
148 The dissent in Grossman demarcates that "the termination without cause provision
significantly impacts detrimentally on the integrity, stability, and maintenance of the
patient-physician relationship... [and] the provision is clearly outweighed by the
Public policy of the state to protect that relationship." Grossman, 12 P.3d at 273.
49 Pappas, 564 Pa. at 419.
150 See Anthony L. DeWitt, HMOs Won't Look Twice At AMA's Model Agreement
(Apr. 1998), available at
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9804/9804.ama-contract.shtml (last
visited Aug. 1, 2005).
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contracts. 151 Its model agreement is therefore meant to reduce
inequalities in bargaining power and includes model language for
addressing legitimate physician concerns in several areas, including
autonomy and patient rights. It provides a measure of standardization,
defines commonly used contracting terms, and, most importantly, the
model restricts interference with the delivery of care by the
physicians.152 Aetna's contract and others of a similar nature led to the
birth of the AMA's Model Managed Care Medical Services Agreement
and other that strives to enhance fairness for physicians contracting
with MCOs. 1
53
4. MCO Liability Under Negligence Theories
Although contract law does not require the parties to behave
altruistically toward each other, physicians by their very nature are
altruistic beings. 154 While their contractual relationships and duty to
provide a reasonable standard of care have traditionally made them
fiduciaries, in its purest sense, Pegram reveals that the role of the
physician as a fiduciary has been replaced by the managed care
entity. 15 5 Within the confines of the MCO, the principle of freedom of
contract is inapplicable to the physician-patient relationship, primarily
because the superior bargaining power of the MCO creates an adhesion
contract. 156  Therefore a MCO that contracts with a physician to
15 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (8th ed. 2004). (Adhesion contract is
a contract balanced in favor of one party over the other that one can assume it was not
entered into on equal bargaining grounds. Adhesion contracts are usually formed
when one person is in a superior bargaining position and pressures the other party into
a contract with unfair or oppressive terms).
152 See DeWitt, supra note 151 ("Noninterference with Medical Care: Nothing in this
Agreement is intended to create ... any right of Company or any other Payor to
intervene in any manner in the methods or means by which Medical Services Entity
renders health care services ... to Enrollees. Nothing herein shall be construed to
require Medical Services Entity to take any action inconsistent with professional
judgment concerning the medical care and treatment to be rendered to Enrollees").
153 American Medical Association, Model Managed Care Agreement (1997)
(availability online restricted to AMA members).
154 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
(1) J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993); see also Pegram v. Hedrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 2158
(2000) (determining that HMO physicians are not fiduciaries to beneficiaries).
' Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2158.
156 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 153 (The term 'contract of adhesion'
signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior
bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere
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provide medical care at a discounted rate can be held liable for the
negligent acts of that physician since the physician is in such a
weakened contractual position that his acts are essentially vicariously
those of the MCO.
In Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 157 a staff model MCO
was found to be liable for a physician's negligent failure to diagnose
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In reversing the trial
court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the MCO, the
appellate court noted that enrollees in the HMO paid a monthly charge
in return for specifically enumerated medical services.1 59 The court
further noted that the treating physicians contracted with the MCO
under an "employment contract, " received annual salaries, and were
barred from working for another employer without consent of the
HMO. 160 Under the provisions of the physician's employment contract,
final authority for all medical policy matters was assigned to the
medical director whose decision prevailed over the treating physicians
in the event of a dispute between both parties. 161 Reasoning that an
HMO was vicariously liable if the plaintiff could establish negligence
on the part of its employees in the performance of their duties under
control of the HMO, the court determined that the HMO was
vicariously liable for its physicians' malpractice.
162
Similarly, Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd of Illinois1 63 underscores
the preceding ethical-legal discourse and makes more transparent the
radically foreign position in which physicians find themselves in the
managed healthcare setting. Here, a three-month-old child presented
with constipation and fever. 164 She was taken by her mother, Sheila
Jones, for evaluation by a physician employed by the Chicago HMO
Ltd. of Illinois (hereinafter Chicago HMO), with whom she was a
member. 165 The child's assigned physician was unavailable and an
to the contract or reject it; adhesion contracts are legally enforceable. It is a
standardized contract drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength that
relegates to the weaker party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it;
these contracts have been denounced by the AMA); see also American Medical
Association Model Managed Care Medical Services Agreement (2000).
157 Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
158 Id. at 1109.
159Id. at 1105.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 See Sloan, 516 N.E.2d at 1108.
163 See Jones v. Chicago HO Ltd. of Illinois, 730 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. 2000).
164 Id. at 1123.
165 See id.
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assistant advised the mother to administer castor oil to the child. 166
Later that evening Jones spoke with the plan physician who
recommended no change in treatment. 167 When the infant's condition
failed to improve, the mother took her to the hospital where she was
subsequently diagnosed as having bacterial meningitis, from which she
suffered permanent brain damage.' 
68
The paramount issue revolved around the point at which a MCO
should accept liability under the doctrine of institutional negligence.
Rather than relying solely on ethical principles such as justice,
autonomy and beneficence, physicians contracting with MCO must
blend these ethical principles with legal safeguards and use them to
advocate on behalf of patients. In Jones, the court held that an HMO
could be held liable under the doctrine of direct corporate negligence,
also known as institutional negligence.' 
69
The Jones case provides a striking example of the scope and
broad judicial application of the principle of institutional negligence in
managed care. The Court found the plaintiff had properly alleged a
cause of action against the HMO by focusing on the administrative and
managerial activities of Chicago HMO versus the professional conduct
or activities of the individual physician. 170 Dr. Jordan, the primary
care physician, had between 2,500 to 5,000 patients and an average
capitation rate of $34.19 per patient per month regardless of services he
rendered.171 The Court bifurcated the dual ethical-legal issue presented
into two separate issues: a) patient load and b) appointment
procedures. 172 This distinction is important for managed care litigation
and ethics in that both aspects of patient clinical care were scrutinized
by the Court. In Jones, the physician breached his professional
obligation by taking responsibility for an excessive number of
Medicaid patients in violation of established customary guidelines.
Additionally, the defendant physician's failure to schedule an
immediate appointment to see the sick infant or instruct the parent to
obtain immediate medical care elsewhere was both a deviation from the
standard of care as well as unethical.
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 See Jones, 730 N.E.2d at 1123.
169 See id
170 Id at 1132.
171 Idat 1123.
172 Id.
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D. The Plan as a Contract
The basic tenets of general contract law apply to the covered benefits
available to plan enrollees, although plan contracts are heuristic at best.
By offering a set of benefits and a list of excluded services, the MCO
seeks to limit its exposed risks and to curtail costs. It is well settled that
experimental or investigational services are universally excluded by
health plans, a fact that usually angers the public. However, the ,so-
called medically unnecessary or inappropriately provided services often
provoke much conflict and debate. 173  As noted previously, when
disputes arise regarding covered benefits, ERISA review standards
apply with special emphasis on the role of the plan administrator;
otherwise the review is done de novo.
174
l.Plan Contract and Physicians
Physicians may be legally liable for failing to zealously advocate their
patients' cases to insurers. The sentinel case that attached legal force to
this ethical obligation is Wickline v. State of California.175 Here, the
plaintiff, Ms. Wickline, was discharged four days after surgery based
on a Medi-Cal coverage decision, despite her surgeon's request for
eight additional days of hospitalization due to post-operative
complications.176 Ms. Wickline subsequently developed compounded
post-operative complications that resulted in amputation of her leg. 177
Although the resulting malpractice complaint against Medi-Cal was
dismissed, the court noted in dicta that "the physician who complies
without protest with the limitations imposed by a third party payer,
when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his
ultimate responsibility for his patient's care.' 7 8 The court's reasoning
and reference to adverse medical coverage decisions places physicians
173 See President's Advisory Committee on Consumer Protection & Quality in the
Health Care Industry: Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities: Report to the
President of the United States (1997), available at
http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov/cborr/ (last visited August 8, 2005).
174 See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (holding that
where an employer was the fiduciary and administrator of an un-funded benefit plan
covered by ERISA, the plan's decision to deny benefits was subject to de novo
review.... unless the plan gave the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority
to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan).
175 See Wickline v. State of California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
176 Id. at 812-14 (the state's utilization review personnel cut the requested eight
additional days in half).
177 Id. at 815-16.
178 Id. at 819.
[VOL.8.3:559
IS ETHICS FOR SALE?
on notice of their fiduciary duty to advocate for their managed care
patients where quality of care and medical necessity are at issue. 1
79
2.Plan Contract and Patients
In regard to perceived fiduciary obligations and concomitant
notification responsibilities, courts have also expressed concerns
regarding the lack of transparency in healthcare contracts between
MCOs and patients. In Gryalva v. Shalala, the court ordered the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to require Medicare-
contracting HMOs to give their enrollees written notice and appropriate
reconsideration when services are denied, reduced, or terminated. 8 °
Medicare statute and regulations mandate that HMOs provide a
procedural framework for resolution of grievances and for
reconsideration hearings when enrollees are denied services.
1 8
'
E. A Comment to the Law
In 1957, the American Medical Association noted that "the honored
ideals of the medical profession implied that the responsibility of the
physician extend not only to the individual, but also to society."' 8
2
Decades earlier, one of society's greatest legal minds characterized the
law as "...the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history
is the history of the moral development of the race."' 83  As the
juxtaposition of law to ethics becomes increasingly evident, the
physician employed by a managed care entity looks to the law for
solutions within the framework of his/her contractual obligations and
her ethical dilemma(s).
Unfortunately, the law has been slow to proceed. And, some
commentators have noted that "the coercive strategies of MCOs have
been relentless and their continued control over physicians' access to
both patients and payment continue to stifle or subdue the physician's
179 Id. at 819 (dicta) ("...he [the physician] cannot point to the health care payer as the
liability scapegoat when the consequences of his own determinative medical decisions
go sour").
180 Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F.Supp. 747, 754 (D.Ariz. 1996).
181 See generally, 42 U.S.C. 1395 § mm (c)(5)(A) (1994); 42 C.F.R. §405, 701-30.,
405.801-12, 417.600-94 (1994). (Medicare regulations governing termination and
resolution for enrollees).
182 American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics (1957), reprinted in
ETHICS IN MEDICINE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS
38-39 (Stanley J. Reiser et al. eds., 2nd ed. 1977).
183 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
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zeal to exercise unfettered advocacy for patients. ' i 4 As evidenced by
the next discussion, the managed care environment necessarily creates
a different perspective on the relationship between individual physician
obligations and state regulation of professional competence.
IV. STATE MEDICAL LICENSING BOARDS: OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATION IN MANAGED CARE
State licensing boards have assumed a prominent role within the
managed care environment, especially as states have attempted to
regulate the practice of medicine and alleviate public perceptions and
concerns that managed care is lower quality care. Through medical
practice and managed care acts, state legislatures have enacted statutory
provisions to regulate and guide the conduct of all stakeholders in
managed care transactions, including patients, providers, and payers.'1 85
A. Jurisdiction of Medical Licensing Boards
Pursuant to their broadly enumerated police powers, states have broad
latitude to regulate the practice of medicine. Commentators have noted
that "Congress has provided few limitations on this power...and the
United States Supreme Court has only limited it when it directly
conflicts with certain limited constitutional rights of patients. '1 86 Each
state utilizes medical licensing boards to wield this power over medical
professionals through medical practice acts. The purpose of these acts
is to provide laws and regulations that govern the grant and use of the
privilege to practice medicine in the interest of public health, safety,
and welfare; the acts also protect the public from the unprofessional,
improper, unlawful, fraudulent and/or deceptive practice of
medicine. 18 These laws generally invest broad powers in the boards
184 MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST 8 (1993) ("The central canon of medical ethics.., emphasizes that
physicians have a duty to be loyal to patients; to act in their patients' interests; to
make their patients' welfare their first consideration, even when their own financial
well-being is opposed; and to keep patient information confidential").
185 See, e.g., Illinois Managed Care Reform and Patient Rights Act, 215 ILL. COMP.
STAT § 134/1 (2003).
186 See Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical
Practice: A Historical Review and guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of
Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANN. HEALTH L. 201
(1999).
187 Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, A Guide to the Essentials
of a Modern Medical Practice Act, at § 1 (Apr. 2000); see also Al. Code § 32-24-50
et seq. (2002), As. Stat. § 08.64.010 et seq. (2004), 13 Az. Stat. § 32-1401 et seq.
(2004), Calif Bus & Prof. Code § 2000 et seq. (2004), 17 Ark. Code Ann. § 95 et seq.
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by stating that the "primary responsibility and obligation of the state
medical board is to protect the public."
1 88
The broad and general language in the various medical practice
acts reflects a growing trend to expand the jurisdiction of state medical
licensing boards to regulate the activities of MCOs, corporate entities
that cannot, by definition and statutory proscription, practice
medicine. 189  However, medical licensure boards face resource
constraints that affect their ability to take formal action. 190 Therefore,
since many licensure boards lack financial resources, information
action may be a more rational strategy for boards to pursue in some
cases. 191 For example, although state medical boards increasingly seek
to discipline health plan medical directors who deny coverage of
treatment recommended by a treating physician, the required
(2003), 12 Col. Rev. Stat. § 36 et seq. (2004), 24 Del. Code § 1702 et seq. (2004), 10
Guam Code Ann. § 12203 et seq. (2004), 32 Fla. Stat. § 458 et seq. (2004), 360 Ga.
Stat. § 2 et seq. (2004), 453 Hawaii Rev. Stat. (2004), 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 60/1 et
seq. (2004), 653 Ia. Code § 1.1 et seq. (2004), 6 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 100-6.1 et seq.
(2004), 218 Kent. Rev. Stat. § 31.550 et seq. (2004), 37 La. Rev. Stat. §1261-1291 et
seq. (2004), 1 Maine Stat. § 373 (2004), Md. Stat. § 14-101 et seq. (2004), 243 Code
Mass. Rev. § 1.0 et seq. (2004), 147 Minn. Stat. § 147.001 et seq. (2003), Miss. Rev.
Stat. § I et seq. (2003), 334 Missouri Stat. §334.002 et seq. (2002), 37 Mont. Code
Ann. § 3-101 et seq. (2003), 172 Neb. Ad. Code § 001.01 et seq. (2004), 630 Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 3 et seq. (2004), 329 New Hamp. Rev. Stat. § 1 et seq. (2004), 45 New
Jers. Stat. § 1-1 et seq. (2002), 61 New Mex. Stat. Ann. § 6-1 et seq. (2003), 131 New
York Stat. § 6520 et seq. (2004), 90 No. Car. Gen. Stat. § I et seq. (2004), 43 N. Dak.
Stat. § 17-01 et seq. (2004), Ohio Rev. Code § 4731.01 et'seq. (20040, Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 644.010 et seq. (2004), 63 Penn. Stat. § 422.6 et seq. (2004), 5 Gen. Laws of Rh. Is.
§ 37-1 et seq. (2004), 40 S. Car. Code § 47-5 et seq. (2004), 63 Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-
101 et seq. (1999), Tex. Stat. § 151 to 165 (2003), 58 Ut. Stat. § 67-101 (2004), 26
Vt. Stat. Ch. 23, § 1311 et seq. (2004), 29 Va. Code § 54.1-2900 et seq. (2004), 3 W.
Va. Rev. Stat. § 30-3-1 (2004), 26 Wy. Code § 33-101 et seq. (2004).
188 See generally The Special Committee on Managed Care, Recommendations
adopted by the House of Delegates of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the
United States, Inc. (May 1998), available at http://www.fsmb.org.
189 See id
190 Damon Adams, Texas medical board funding will help root out bad doctors (July
21, 2003), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2003/07/21/prsb0721.htm (last visited Feb 28, 2005) (noting
many physicians' belief that the legislation that allowed for increased funding to the
medical board would greatly improve the board and allow it to better regulate
physicians and protect patients).
191 Richards, supra note 192, at 201-02 (citing Timothy S. Jost, ct al., Consumers,
Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A Look at Medical Licensure Boards, 309
Health Matrix 335-36 (1993)); see also Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Quality of
Medical Care: Regulations, Management , or the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 825
(1995).
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concomitant increase in revenue funding and/or staff resources
necessary to increase coverage may not occur. As a result, medical
directors not only face a conflict between their duties as a health plan
director and their ethical responsibilities to provide necessary and
effective treatment to patients, they must also mediate such conflicts
within a risk calculus to determine the probability of licensing board
intervention and action. In short, the overall value of medical boards
acting on information received about a physician under review and
proceeding with costly independent investigations is dubious, at best.
However, to better understand the limits of state licensing board
intervention, the following is a brief analysis of the components of
select cases involving medical determination decisions and state
licensing board investigations.
2. Medical Necessity Decisions
A medical licensing board may choose to review medical necessity
decisions or denial of covered benefits. Medical necessity decisions by
health plan directors encompass one category of state medical licensing
board disciplinary activities. In Murphy v. Board of Medical
Examiners of Arizona, the Arizona Supreme Court held that John F.
Murphy, Medical Director for Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Arizona,
made a "medical decision" when he denied pre-certification for a
patient's surgery and was thus subject to review of professional
conduct by the Arizona Board of Medical Examiners (BOMEX).192 In
this case, Dr. Murphy had refused to pre-certify, or authorize, a
patient's gallbladder surgery because it was not medically necessary,
however, this denial of pre-certification was contrary to the advice of
the patient's surgeon.193 Further, Dr. Murphy offered to submit the
matter to a third party specialist for review at Blue Cross's expense, but
both the patient and surgeon declined. 194  Despite the denied pre-
certification, the surgeon performed the operation and the patient
subsequently filed a complaint with the Arizona Department of
Insurance asserting that Dr. Murphy and Blue Cross failed to honor the
insurance contract. 195 The surgeon also submitted a complaint to the
BOMEX regarding Dr. Murphy's unprofessional conduct and medical
incompetence arguing that [Murphy's decision] caused the patient to
question the surgeon's judgment and dangerously affected the
192 Murphy v. Board of Medical Examiners of Arizona, 949 P.2d 530, 531(Ariz. Ct.
App. 1997).
'9' Id. at 532.
194 Id. at 533.
195 Id.
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physician-patient relationship. 196  Although Dr. Murphy argued that
the Board could not review his action because he was "not involved in
patient care and not involved in the practice of medicine,' 197 the Court
ruled that such decisions were not insurance decisions but medical
decisions.' 98  The Court reasoned that Dr. Murphy, in making his
determination to deny pre-certification, was required to consider
whether the procedure was 1) "appropriate for the [patient's] symptoms
and diagnosis of the condition;" 2) "provided for the diagnosis, care or
treatment;" and 3) "in accordance with standards of good medical
practice in Arizona."'
' 99
Typically, when the Arizona Board of Medicine receives a
complaint against a physician, there are three options: dismiss the
complaint, file a letter of concern,2 °° or file a letter of reprimand. In
this case, the Board voted to issue an advisory letter of concern. Since
the letter of concern did not materially affect Dr. Murphy's legal rights,
duties, or privileges, it was not a final decision subject to review before
the Court.
20
In his defense, Dr. Murphy made a compelling argument that
such jurisdiction would lead to a flood of complaints against medical
directors by treating physicians and patients who dispute medical
necessity decisions. However, the Court opted to defer to the
legislature to consider these practical consequences and to resolve any
underlying policy conflicts. In any event, the Murphy case gives rise
to questions regarding the appropriateness of assigning responsibility to
medical directors of managed care organizations to make coverage
determinations. Physicians opting to serve as medical directors should
carefully review and seek partial or full indemnification or liability
coverage from the managed care organization, and must be acutely
aware of the complex relationship between coverage determinations,
the practice of medicine, and professional competence.
3.Denial of Covered Benefits
Another area that may subject a physician/health plan medical director
to medical licensing board review is a determination or denial of
196 Id.
197 Murphy, 949 P.2d at 533.
198 Id. at 536.
19 9 Id.
200 A letter of concern is a public document and may be used in future disciplinary
actions against a physician. Id. at 536.
201 Id. at 537-538.
202 Murphy, 949 P.2d at 538.
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covered benefits contrary to the clinical case presentation. In the case
of United Healthcare Insurance Co. v. Levy, 20 3 the Texas Board of
Medical Licensure initiated an action to suspend an HMO medical
director's license to practice after he made a determination that the care
provided to ventilator dependent patients was not "therapeutic" but
"custodial," not "therapeutic" and therefore not a covered benefit under
the contractual terms of the plan. 204 The case involved a thirteen-year-
old boy with a critical respiratory condition who was discharged from
Fort Worth Cook Children's Hospital after a five-week stay despite his
physician's recommendation that he be placed on a home mechanical
ventilator and receive nursing care from providers trained in
cardiopulmonary resuscitation and ventilator care.20 5 Although United's
medical director consulted with the child's physician, he [the director]
interpreted the recommended service as a non-covered service under
206the benefit plan. Thereafter, the father filed a complaint with the
Texas State Board of Medical Examiners ("the Board") stating that the
director's decision to deny care jeopardized his son's life.20 7
The Board held an informal settlement conference to determine
whether the medical director's benefit determination was in violation of
the Texas Medical Practice Act. 20 8  The Board concluded that the
medical director was practicing medicine when he made the benefit
decision and that the Director violated the applicable standard of care in
denying the benefit sought. 20 9  The Board recommended that the
medical director be publicly reprimanded, have his medical license
suspended for two years, pay a five thousand dollar fine, and perform
twelve hours of home training on a mechanical ventilator.
21 0
United Healthcare appealed the Board's decision arguing that
the director's benefit determination did not constitute the practice of
medicine, and thereby precludes the Board's jurisdiction over the
211
matter. United also argued that the Board's attempt to discipline the
203 See United Healthcare Insurance Co. v. Levy, 114 F. Supp. 2d 559 (N.D. Tex.
2000) (In this case, Levy served as a utilization review agent for United Healthcare, a
managed care company that acts as a third-party administrator and reviews and makes
medical necessity determinations for self-funded ERISA plan sponsored by Allstate
Insurance).
204 Id at 560.
205 Id. at 561.
206 Id. at 561.
207 Id. at 561
208 Levy, 114 F. Supp 2d at 561.
209 id.
210 Id.
211 I[d.
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medical director over a benefit determination amounted to improper
regulation of an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA and sought
a temporary restraining order and an injunction enjoining the Board
from enforcing its recommendations.2 12
However, the Board filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
Congress did not intend for ERISA to preempt a state's ability to
regulate the practice of medicine within its borders and that ERISA did
not confer jurisdiction on the Court to substitute its judgment for that of
the Board. In response, Levy and the HMO filed suit in federal
district court to block the suspension actions of the Texas Board of
Medical Licensure asserting that ERISA applied, the Board's efforts
constituted an attempt to regulate an ERISA-governed plan, and that
such conduct is preempted under ERISA.214 The court held that the
federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
preempted the Board from taking action against Levy who was acting
as a "utilization review agent" when he determined what qualified as
custodial care under the Plan.
215
Typically, in deciding ERISA cases, courts assess whether a
medical treatment decision is made affecting the quality of a healthcare
service or an administrative benefits determination affecting the
quantity of a healthcare service. Because the scope of medical practice
has broadened as a result of rapidly advancing medical technology,
physician's ethical obligations have also expanded, and as such courts
have increasingly equated "coverage denial" with "medical decision"
even where the medical doctor never diagnosed, examined, or proffered
treatment.216
The Court in Levy is distinguishable from courts that
increasingly equate coverage denial with medical decision. The Court
in Levy first considered whether United Healthcare's medical director's
benefit determination should be considered a medical decision, since it
could be subject to the Board's regulatory authority if identified as
such.217 The Court concluded that the medical director's decision was a
"pure coverage determination" since the director never "diagnosed,
treated, or offered to treat" the child in question.218 The medical
director did not independently exercise medical judgment when he
212 Id. at 561.
213 Levy, 114 F. Supp. at 562.
2 1 4 
id.
215 id.
216 See generally Calad, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8538.
217 Levy, 114 F. Supp. at 562.
218 Id. at 564.
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decided that the recommended treatment fell within the Plan's
definition of "custodial care" and thus was not a covered benefit.2 19
However, the Court specifically refused to decide the question of
whether a physician, who otherwise engages in the practice of
medicine, is subject to the Board's authority if s/he acts as a utilization
review agent and exercises medical judgment to determine what is
medically necessary for a patient's care.220  The Court's refusal to
address this issue leaves the door open for boards of medicine to hold
plan administrators liable for benefit decisions predicated on a
determination of medical necessity.
The second question before the Court in Levy was whether
ERISA preempted the Board's regulation of a coverage determination
by a physician acting for a third-party health care administrator.2 2 ' The
Court found when the Board independently reviewed the requested
services and determined they were "not custodial," it, in effect,
"substitute[ed] for the administrator's decision its own judgment of
whether requested services fall within the Plan."222 The Court further
noted that "[s]hould [United's medical director], or any other doctor,
elect not to follow the mandates of the Board's determination of what is
"custodial care," license suspension or other penalties will presumably
result. 223 The Court ruled that this "result create[d] inconsistent and
conflicting state regulation which ERISA's drafters sought to avoid., 224
Accordingly, the Court held that the Board's action effectively called
for "a defacto mandatory guideline for the determination of custodial
care" under the Plan in question, which is prohibited by ERISA.225
The Court was also persuaded by United Healthcare's argument
that the Board disregarded the statutory mechanism for the review of
denied claims by setting forth its own rules for how an ERISA plan
should be administered. Noting that the federal courts have held that
ERISA and federal regulations alone govern the review of such plan
benefit denials, the Court held that the Board's conduct improperly
offered an alternative enforcement mechanism to the federal system
already in place.227 Indeed, rather than filing claims via ERISA-
mandated mechanisms, plan participants could simply complain to the
219 Id. at 564.
220 Id. at 564-65.
221 Id. at 565.
222 Levy, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
223 Id. at 564.
224 Id. at 564.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Levy, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
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228Board about an adverse coverage determination. The Court
furthered that the Board's authority to suspend medical licenses made
its review have a "binding effect on the Plan, ensuring that the Plan will
be interpreted and administered in a way dictated by the Board" and
this outcome would be "in direct contravention to ERISA's objective of
avoiding a 'multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally
uniform administration of employee benefit plans.'
229
Still, the court's opinion never addressed whether benefit
decisions predicated upon a medical necessity determination fall within
the same safe harbor. For instance, physician-medical directors who
substitute a treating physician's recommendation with an alternative
treatment plan, or deny coverage because it is "not medically
necessary" remain subject to a medical board's disciplinary decision.
In such a situation, medical directors are afforded the greatest
protection if the health plan brings suit against the disciplinary board,
as in Levy, since a health plan, unlike individual physicians, may
invoke the ERISA preemption doctrine.
B. Recent Case Developments
In Levy, the Court limited its decision to the narrow facts of this
particular case and specifically reserved decision on whether a
physician who acts as a utilization review agent and exercises judgment
to determine medical necessity is covered by the Board's regulatory
authority.23°  However, the validity of this limited ruling may be
challenged in light of recent developments in case law. Traditionally,
ERISA allowed medical directors to avoid liability for their coverage
decisions because such determinations were considered a
"determination of benefits" rather than the "practice of medicine."23'
As a general matter detailed throughout this paper, the recent United
States Supreme Court decision of Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran
has altered the legal landscape in terms of managed care litigation and
ERISA preemption, and has left the matter of "determination of
benefits" versus "practice of medicine" to be addressed by individual
states. 232 The United States Supreme Court determined in Rush that
state laws mandating external review of certain denials were not
preempted by ERISA.2 33 In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that these
228 Id.
229 id.
210 Id. at 562.
231 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998).
232 See Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002).
233 Id. at 2151.
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laws regulated insurance and therefore were not subject to
234preemption.
Rush is significant for several reasons. First, this decision
validates a number of state laws that establish procedures for claimants
to obtain neutral, third party reviews for certain types of coverage
denials. While the laws regarding the procedures vary widely from
state to state, the denials are often on the grounds of "medical
necessity" or "experimental or investigational" procedures.235 Had the
Court found that the procedures were subject to preemption, all of these
laws would have become, in effect, unenforceable.
Second, this decision elucidates the argument that HMOs (and
therefore, MCOs) are to be treated as insurance companies, and
therefore subject to the same state laws and regulations that apply to
insurance companies. The Court rejected the HMO's claims that it was
not an insurance company but a contractor providing administrative
services, and any notions that an HMO was "a medical matchmaker,
bringing together ERISA plans and medical care providers.', 236 The
Court further noted that HMOs have assumed much of the business
formerly performed by traditional indemnity insurers, and thus held
that HMOs must be viewed as insurance companies for regulatory
237purposes.
Third, this decision is important in that it arguably reflects a
U.S. Supreme Court trend to narrow the scope of ERISA preemption.
In both Pegram (holding that state malpractice laws are not preempted
by ERISA) and Rush, the availability of ERISA preemption is less
favorable to claimants and more advantageous for managed care
organizations because: 1) ERISA does not permit the award of
damages; 2) the only remedies allowed are payment of benefits that
were wrongfully denied, equitable relief, and attorneys fees; 3) there is
exclusive federal court jurisdiction; and 4) there is no right to trial by
jury.
At this point, a brief comparative discussion of cases and
concepts will elucidate the integral dichotomies between physician's
ethical responsibilities, ERISA, managed care, and patient care. The
Murphy case differs from Levy in a fundamental way -- the physician in
Murphy brought the lawsuit independent of the health plan. Therefore,
ERISA preemption was not a consideration in this case and Dr. Murphy
was not subjected to sanctions. However, both cases hinge on an
234 Id.
235 Id. at 2171.
236 Id. at 2162.
237 Moran, 122 S. Ct. at 2163.
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important procedural question - whether the state licensing boards have
jurisdiction to oversee a medical director's benefit decisions.
Historically, the federal government has left the definition of
medical practice and the extent of licensing to the states.238 According
to the Federation of State Medical Boards, sixteen (16) states have
recently promulgated laws explicitly requiring HMO medical directors
to be licensed physicians in the state where the health plan is located.
However, since ERISA preempts all state laws that relate to an
employee benefit plan, courts must determine whether coverage denials
may be considered the "practice of medicine" or as merely
administrative decisions governed by ERISA.
C. ERISA and Investigation of Medical Directors
Recognizing that the facts of each individual case are outcome-
determinative, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided minimal guidance
by refusing to certify or address the issue of medical practice and
medical benefit determinations.239 Nowhere is this more evident than
in the Missouri case of State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts
v. Fallon. Here, Dr. Fallon, a physician and surgeon licensed in
Missouri, was employed as the Medical Director of Prudential Health
Care. 240 The Board began an investigation into a complaint against Dr.
Fallon regarding his determination that a requested surgical procedure
"was not medically necessary." 24 1 Dr. Fallon's defense was three-fold:
1) ERISA supercedes Missouri law to the extent that it authorizes the
Board to investigate matters related to an employee benefit plan; 2)
Missouri law does not authorize the Board to investigate "utilization
review" cases; and 3) his decisions as a medical director did not
involve the "practice of medicine., 242 The Missouri Supreme Court
determined that ERISA did not preempt state law, and held that:
[T]he determinations at issue in this case fall outside the scope of
plan administration. Dr. Fallon did not simply look to a
238 See U.S. CONST. Amend. X; see generally GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 65 (12th ed. 1991) (noting that the Constitution specifies federal powers while
leaving non-delegated powers to the states).
239 See State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Fallon, 41 S.W.3d 474, 25
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2547 (Mo. 2001); Fallon v. Mo. Bd. of Registration
for the Healing Arts, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 993, 122 S. Ct. 459, 26 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2920 (2001).
240 Fallon, 41 S.W.3d at 476.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 476.
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predetermined list of covered procedures to arrive at his conclusions.
He used medical training and judgment to make a decision...
analytically distinct from the coverage policies adopted by the
employee benefit plan.243
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Dr. Fallon's actions were subject
to the oversight of the Board.244 The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari, leaving the Missouri Supreme Court's decision
241intact.
1. Fallon Compared to Murphy and Levy
The Fallon decision is consistent with both Murphy and Levy. The
Court in Fallon underscored the importance of the distinct nature of the
two determinations in this case.246 The Court explained that Prudential,
the insurance company, made an administrative decision when it
determined that the plan would not extend benefits to cover the elective
surgery unless the medical director found it to be needed and
appropriately provided.247 Dr. Fallon, however, made a purely medical
decision when he determined that the procedure was not medically
necessary. 248 Relying on the reasoning set forth in the Murphy case,
the Court ruled that this administrative decision led to a denial of
coverage but embodied the medical judgment of a licensed professional
who determined the necessity of a procedure for a specific patient.249
This outcome reflects the tendency of courts to equate coverage denials
with medical decision-making despite the fact that the doctor, against
her ethical obligations as a treating physician, may never have
diagnosed, examined, treated, or offered to treat a patient.
D. Physician Application for Licensure and Managed Care
In another case involving managed care and licensing boards, Morris v.
District of Columbia Board of Medicine, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of a board that denied a physician's application to be
licensed in the District of Columbia. 250 Dr. Morris was hired by Blue
Cross Blue Shield to serve as the Vice President and Medical Director
243 Id. at 477.
244 Id. at 478.
245 Fallon, 534 U.S. at 993.
246 Fallon, 41 S.W. 3d at 476.
247 Id. at 476.
248 Id. at 477.
249 Id.
250 See Morris v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine, 701 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1997).
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of the National Capitol Area.25 1 But because Dr. Morris, a licensed
physician in three other states, signed letters as "Gregory K. Morris,
M.D., Vice President and Medical Director" in his position at Blue
Cross, his application for a license was denied. 252 The board took the
position that by affixing "M.D." to his name and title he was
representing to the public that he was licensed to practice medicine
within the District of Columbia.
253
In reversing the Board's decision, the Court of Appeals pointed
out that Dr. Morris' duties and responsibilities were "exclusively
administrative."254 Limiting its decision to the facts of that case, the
court commented:
This does not mean, of course, that on other facts a medical
administrator of a health insurer such as Blue Cross which monitors
and regularly questions treatment decisions by physicians, may not
be found to have practiced medicine ... The focus must be on the
actions of the individual administrator, not his job title or
identification as 'M.D.'
255
At this juncture, it appears from a case law perspective, that physicians
serving as medical directors have a panoply of competing legal duties
and ethical obligations. Interestingly enough, other third parties
involved in the regulatory and oversight arena, have asserted different
positions regarding medical determination decisions and the practice of
the medicine.
E. Statutory and Regulatory Guidelines
Given the variety of existing case law on the subject of physician
obligations, competence, medical judgments, and managed care
decisions, a fundamental need exists for concrete and regulatory
guidelines. The following are a few examples of statutory and/or
regulatory attempts to provide useful reference points for law, ethics,
medicine, and managed care.
1. State Attorney General Opinions
The Attorneys General of Ohio, Mississippi, and North Carolina, have
issued opinions that utilization reviews do not constitute the practice of
251 Id. at 365.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 366.
255 Morris, 701 A.2d at 368.
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256
medicine. Although Attorneys General opinions are not binding as
law, they are written interpretations of existing law and will usually be
honored by state agencies' as advice from their legal counsel.
257
Ultimate determination of a law's applicability, meaning or
constitutionality is left to the courts. Currently, the impact and
interpretation of such states' opinions have yet to be litigated in the
managed care arena.
2. Federation of State Medical Boards
The Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) is a non-profit entity
that serves as the umbrella organization for all state medical boards,
and provides strategic policy advice, recommendations, and guidance
for medical licensing of physicians. In 1996, then Federation President
James E. West, MD, established a Special Committee on Managed
Care in order to evaluate the impact of managed care on the medical
regulatory system. The Committee was charged with specific tasks,
summarized from the Policy Recommendations:
* Evaluating the current relationships between
managed care organizations (MCOs) and state
medical boards to determine the required amount
of public protection;
" Determining what data collected by managed care
organizations may be used by state medical
boards in assessing quality of care by physicians;
* Reviewing the different forms of contractual
relationships between managed care organizations
and physicians to determine which types of
contracts, if any, might endanger public health
and welfare; and
" Evaluating methods used by managed care
organizations in selecting/deselecting physicians
for participation and the effects of minor
256 See generally 1999 Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. No. 99-044, 1999 WL 692623 (Ohio A.G.
August 31, 1999); 1993 WL 207359 (Miss. A.G. 1999); 60 N.C. Op. Atty. Gen. 100
(1999) (Attorney General Opinions regarding the practice of medicine).
257 See generally COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL (1980) (outlining the historical
development of the office of attorney general and its specific common-law powers).
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disciplinary actions taken by state medical
boards.258
As a direct result of the information gathered by the FSMB
Special Committee on Managed Care, the FSMB adopted a policy
urging licensing boards to require all medical directors of managed care
organizations to hold current and unrestricted medical licenses in states
where patients in the plan reside. 259 The rationale for this policy was to
allow state medical boards to gain jurisdiction over plan medical
directors to ensure accountability and promote professionalism among
260physicians. Moreover, individual states have imposed specific
statutory requirements and obligations upon managed care
organizations and physicians serving as directors of MCO's.
3. State Licensing Requirements for HMO Medical Directors
In response to such policy recommendations, various states261 adopted
statutes requiring HMO/managed care medical directors to be licensed
physicians with valid licenses. These states include: Delaware,262 New
Jersey,2 63 Virginia, 264 Florida,265 Missouri, 266 Vermont,
267 Georgia 268
258 See 240.006, FSMB Special Committee Report on Managed Care, available at
http://www.fsmb.org (adopted as policy recommendations in April 1998, reaff'd April
2001).
259 See generally Special Committee on Managed Care, Recommendations Adopted by
the House of Delegates of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United
States, Inc. (May 1998), available at http://www.fsmb.org.
260 id.
26 1 Not an exclusive listing. At press date, states do not have uniform requirements on
licensing for managed care medical directors. For more information on up-to-date
legislative activity in the states, see National Conference on State Legislatures, at
www.ncsl.org.
262 See 16 Del. Code § 9112 (2004) (Managed care organization directors and
licensing requirement).
263 See N.J. Stat. § 26:2S-6 (2004) (Designation of licensed physician as medical
director for managed care organization).
264 See Ch. 43, Vir. Code Ann. § 38.2-4319 (2005) (Health maintenance
organizations; medical directors). See also Ch. 43, Vir. Code Ann. §38.2-4305
(2005) (Health maintenance organizations; medical directors and fiduciary
responsibilities).
265 See 32 Fla. Stat. § 456.0375 (2004); Repealed 3/1/2004. (Registration of certain
clinics; requirements; discipline; exemptions).
266 See 23 R.S.Mo. § 354.400 (2004) (Health maintenance organizations).
267 See 26 Vt. Stat. An. § 1851 (2003) (License requirements).
268 See 33 OCGA § 20A-5 (2002) (Standards for certification).
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North Carolina,269 and California. 270  For example, the State of
Delaware271 adopted this requirement using the following language:
(b) A managed care organization shall have a medical director. The
medical director shall be licensed to practice medicine in Delaware in
accordance with § 1702 of Title 24. The medical director's duties
shall include, at a minimum, those specified in regulations
promulgated by the Department pursuant to the
authority granted in § 9110 of this title. The medical director may
assign duties to other physicians and non-physician personnel
employed by, or under contract to, the managed care organization,
provided, however, that the medical director shall retain
responsibility for assigned duties. Any decision to deny a
covered service shall be rendered by a physician.
By identifying a medical director as a licensed physician who may
issue coverage denial decisions, the statute creates accountability
otherwise not present with managed care decision-making.
Furthermore, by framing the denial of services by a managed care
medical director as a legislative mandate, the issue of professional
obligation following ethical guidelines is also turned into a legal
imperative.
The final example of physicians' fiduciary obligations clashing
with the managed care environment regard disclosure to patients and
contractual "gag" clauses.
G. Disclosure and Gag Clauses
Gag clauses 272 are provisions in the contract between the physician and
the health plan that limit the amount of information a provider may tell
a patient-enrollee about treatments and services offered by the plan.273
These clauses often embody conflicting obligations when a procedure
or treatment may be medically necessary or medically indicated for a
269 See 17 NC Gen. Stat. § 131E-280 (2004) (Applicants for license).
270 See Cal. Health & Saf Code § 1367.01 (Health care plans; licensing provision).
271 See 16 Del. Code § 9112 (2004).
272 Gag clauses may be categorized into three areas: 1) discussion of non-covered
medical treatment options; 2) anti-disparagement clauses prohibiting the physician
from criticizing the managed care organization; and 3) confidentiality clauses
prohibiting the physician from disclosing any proprietary information or confidential
trade secrets, which may broadly encompass financial incentives and conflicts of
interests. See Nancy J. Picinic, Physicians, Bound and Gagged: Federal Attempts to
Combat Managed Care's Use of Gag Clauses, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 567 (1997)
(provides an excellent overview and background on gag clauses, physicians, and
managed care contracts).
273 id.
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particular patient-enrollee, but cannot be mentioned or discussed due to
health plan limitations.
1. Gag Clauses, Fraud, and Class Actions
As a result of competing professional obligations, subsequent litigation
has begun to focus on substantive challenges to the language contained
in managed care contracts. For instance, in Humana v. Castillo et
al.,274 a group of individuals enrolled in the Humana Gold Plus Plan
filed suit against Humana based on claims of fraud, unjust enrichment,
money had and received, and to the "gag clause" language.275 The
plaintiffs alleged that Humana misrepresented and/or failed to disclose
the terms of its arrangements with affiliated primary care physicians.276
Plaintiffs directed attention to the contract language disclosing that the
physicians were paid a flat rate per member per month (capitation); that
Humana had financial arrangements with physicians to create an
incentive not to treat or refer to specialists; that Humana required
physicians to obtain authorization before hospital admissions or before
discussing hospitalization; and that the contracts contained gag clauses
which restricted the physicians' ability to discuss treatment options
with members.277  The allegations noted that the gag clauses
"prohibited [physicians] from disclosing or advising the member of
certain medical treatments Humana would not cover, or did not want to
cover, regardless of whether the treatments or procedures might be
medically advisable or necessary." 278
Unfortunately, the issues before the reviewing court in Humana
were whether the class certification was proper based upon the alleged
counts of fraud and whether the class represented the claims and
allegations of all enrollees similarly situated. The Court held that
certification of the class was improper, but did not address the
individual gag clause allegations against Humana. Regardless, it is
striking to note that Humana serves as an example of an enrollee's
attempts to challenge the outcomes of managed care based upon
contractual obligations her physician must assume to participate in
managed care.
2. Gag Clauses, Fiduciary Duty, and ERISA
274 See Humana v. Castillo, 728 So. 2d 261 (1999).
275 Id. at 263.
276 See Humana, 728 So. 2d at 262.
277 id.
278 Id. at 263.
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Additionally, in Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare,279 the Court held that
allegations about managed care gag clause language was preempted by
ERISA but nevertheless a viable claim. 280  Here, a plaintiff filed a
putative class action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
pursuant to ERISA. Weiss was a participant in an employee benefit
plan operated and administered by CIGNA, and alleged that CIGNA
breached various fiduciary duties required under ERISA. Weiss
specifically alleged that CIGNA engaged in an undisclosed policy of
preventing its physicians from advising patients of treatment options
which were not compensable by the HMO; it enforces this "gag order"
policy by reprimanding or terminating physicians who disclose that
2811CIGNA will not cover treatments that might be useful to the patient.
Plaintiff further claimed that by implementing this policy, CIGNA, as
an insurer, breached its fiduciary obligations and breached its implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.282
Pursuant to ERISA, a person is a fiduciary of a benefit plan if
she exercises any discretionary authority over management of such
plan.2 83 Plan fiduciaries must discharge their duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.
284
Therefore, an HMO can be an ERISA fiduciary when it exercises such
discretionary management over a qualified health benefit plan.2 85 The
substantive issue was thus whether CIGNA's fiduciary capacity and
obligations of loyalty was breached by their policy of restricting the
disclosure of non-covered treatment options. The Court first noted that
physicians have "independent duties to provide full information to their
patients which is not altered by the coverage limitations in the patient's
managed care plan. ''286  It then concluded that "patients cannot be
deprived of such information absent an ethical breach on the part of the
physician and therefore such a rule would provide physicians with no
meaningful choice and would effectively limit the amount of
information available to plan participants.
287
279 See Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, 972 F. Supp. 748, 21 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 1843 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
210 Id. at 751.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (21)(A) (1997).
284 See 29 U.S.C. § 1004 (21)(a)(1) (Lexis 2003).
285 See Weiss, 972 F. Supp. at 751 (citing O'Reilly v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383, 1385
(1 1th Cir. 1990); Morales v. Health Plus, 954 F. Supp. 464 (D.P.R. 1997)).
286 Id. at 752 (citing American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, Council Report: Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330 (1995)).
287 See Weiss, 972 F. Supp. at 752.
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3. Federal Legislation on HMO Gag Clauses
In 1997, federal legislation prohibiting HMO gag clauses, entitled "the
Patient Right to Know Act,, 288 was introduced before the House and
Senate. The legislation was sponsored by Sen. Jon Kyle (R-AZ) and
was referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources.
Legal justification for such federal legislation stemmed from the
doctrine of informed consent, the fiduciary nature of the physician-
patient relationship, and the liability of managed care organizationsunder, . • 289
under respondeat superior. The SB 449, excerpted in part:
Prohibits any contract or agreement, or the operation of any contract
or agreement, between an entity operating a health plan (including
any partnership, association, or other organization that enters into or
administers such a contract or agreement) and a health care provider
(or group of health care providers) from prohibiting or restricting the
provider from engaging in medical communications with his or her
patient. It requires that each State shall enforce this Act with respect
to health insurance issuers that sell, renew, or offer health plans in
the State. It provides for enforcement of this Act by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services if the Secretary, after consultation with
the chief executive officer of a State and the insurance commissioner
or chief insurance regulatory official of the State, determines that the
State has failed to substantially enforce the requirements. It also
mandates a civil money penalty and allows State requirements equal
to or more protective of medical communications than the
requirements of this Act.zg°
A sister bill with mirrored language was also introduced in the
House during the 105 th Congress. HR 565291 was sponsored by Rep.
Greg Ganske (R-IA) and had numerous co-sponsors. However, HR
565 had a similar fate as SB 449 and was referred to the House
288 See generally Patient Right to Know Act, H.R. 586 and S. 449, (105th Cong.,
1997) (these measures were referred to House and Senate Committees; no further
action was taken during the 105 th Congressional session).
289 See generally Picinic, supra note 278).
290 See SB 449, 1997 Bill Tracking SB 449, 105 Bill Tracking SB 449 (105th Cong.,
1st Session, 1997).
291 See HR 586, 1997 Bill Tracking HR 586, 105 Bill Tracking HR 586 (105 th
Congress, 1stSession, 1997).
2005]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
Committee on Education and the Workforce. In 1998, legislation on
292this topic was again introduced in the House as HR 2095, a bill
sponsored by John Boehner (R-OH), which sought to amend ERISA to
make needed reforms to group health plans. Again, the bill was
referred to the House Committee on Education and the Workforce.
Overall, federal legislative efforts to prohibit gag clauses in
managed care contracts were cumulative because the health care
industry and individual states intervened to regulate the use of gag
clauses. As of early 1997, most states had already adopted laws
nullifying gag clauses by MCOs on physicians.293 Those states that do
not adopt independent state legislation may simply adopt the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) proposed Managed
Care Plan Network Adequacy Model Act, which applies to all managed
care plans and provides patients with protections through gag clause
prohibitions, utilization review, and grievance procedures.294
292 See HR 2095, 1999 Bill Tracking HR 2095, 106 Bill Tracking HR 2095 (10 6th
Congress, I" Session, 1998).
293 Id. (citing Colorado: Insurance-Contracts Between Carriers and Health Care
Providers - Required Provisions, Termination of Contract, Dispute Resolution Colo.
Rev. Stat. 10-16-102, 10-16-121 (West 1996) (providing that physicians shall not be
terminated for discussing the patients medical condition including treatment options
or recommendations); Wyoming: Insurance - Health Care Wyo. Stat. Ann. 26-22-504,
26-34-117 (f)(g) (West 1997); Georgia Insurance - Patient Protection Act, Ga. Code
Ann. 33-20A (West 1996) (indicating that an MCO can not penalize a physician for
discussing medically necessary information with patients); Indiana: Insurance -
Referrals to Women's Health Care Providers, Ind. Code. Ann. 27-8-11-4.5 (West
1996) (providing that physicians may disclose financial incentives and all treatment
options with the patient including those not covered under the plan); Virginia:
Accident and Sickness Insurance - Health care Provider Panels, Va. Code. Ann. 38.2-
3407.10 (West 1996) (providing that "no contracts between a carrier and a provider
shall prohibit, impede, or interfere in the discussion of medical treatment options
between a patient and a provider.") In addition, in August of 1996, California enacted
gag clause legislation as an amendment to the Business Code which prohibits an
MCO from retaliating against a physician for advocating on behave of a patient. See
Status Report-State Legislation, Gag Clauses, American Medical Association
[hereinafter Status Report]. In September of 1996, California also enacted legislation
prohibiting gag clauses, which restrict such information concerning treatment options,
alternative health plans, coverage arrangements and other relevant medical
information. Id. On March 19, 1997, Idaho enacted gag clause legislation, which
prevents managed care from restricting doctor-patient communication. Id. Other
states that have proposed legislation prohibiting gag clauses include Delaware, Maine,
Maryland, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. Id.).
294 id.
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To address such situations, medical codes of ethics call on
physicians to recognize the distinction between law and ethics, and
allow ethics to take priority in cases of direct conflict. The Code of
Ethics of the AMA states, for example, "In general, when physicians
believe a law is unjust, they should work to change the law. In
exceptional circumstances of unust laws, ethical responsibilities should
supersede legal obligations." Despite the past utilization of gag
clauses by MCOs, the strength of the physician's ethical duties and
obligations to the patient help provide the strongest arguments against
otherwise business and proprietary practices.
V. CONCLUSION: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR ETHICS
This Note has covered the panoply of information on the ethics of
managed care in the medical environment, as well as the relationship
between medical ethics and attorneys who practice within the managed
care environment. The broad applicability of the basic principles of
biomedical ethics is factored into the reasoning and analysis by Courts
in managed care litigation involving benefit determinations, claim
denials, and/or medical necessity determinations.
Physicians have ethical duties, as embodied in professional
association codes of ethics and conduct, to protect the patient's best
interests and ensure appropriate patient care even if adverse to the
interests of managed care organizations. Similarly, the physician has a
clear obligation to act in a professional capacity as a fiduciary and is
subject to state medical licensing board regulation. As discussed, the
physician who serves as medical director of a managed care
organization has dual, and often conflicting, roles - that of physician as
well as that of MCO employee. Finally, the history and tradition of
managed care, physicians, and professionalism elucidates the striking
balance between consumerism, justice, and contractual obligation.
Despite managed care organizations' attempts to control the
communications between physicians and patients on treatment options
with regard to cost-containment, such gag clauses were ultimately
discarded as an ineffective mechanism.
Ethical issues within the managed care environment are a
condition subsequent in health law. Since most jurisdictions mandate
that health plan medical directors be licensed physicians, subsequent
coverage decisions by medical directors are increasingly interpreted to
295 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT
OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 2004-2005 EDITION 1 (AMA Press 2004) (Opinion
1.02: The Relation of Law and Ethics).
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be the practice of medicine by medical boards and the courts.
Balancing competing considerations, such as cost containment and
quality patient care, includes recognizing that they are neither exclusive
nor inclusive within all managed care situations. Some experts have
noted that business strategies within managed care may be more
beneficial and yield greater acceptance if the ethical values of treatment
staff are consolidated.2 96
To respond to stakeholder issues and concerns, several health
care and managed care organizations have adopted formal
organizational codes of ethics. The American Association of Health
Plans, representing approximately 1,000 HMOs, MCOs, and similar
organizations, has created a Philosophy of Care statement. 297 This
statement articulates a set of principles regarding patient access to
affordable quality care. Incorporating ethical principles into an
organization's culture, rather than treating such issues as an
afterthought or as unrelated to the business of providing health care, is
a major step towards addressing and avoiding potential conflicts.
The responsibility of ensuring ethics in managed care must be
divided between the medical director and the MCO plan. Although
litigation in the managed care setting may be inevitable, the
consequences of any claims brought may be minimized if the Medical
Director is familiar with the laws regarding appropriate licensing
protocols and state Medical Licensing Board jurisdiction, and if the
MCO incorporates an ethical strategy into their business plan.
As a final thought, perhaps ethics and managed care are simply
asymbiotic - given the competing forces of medical review/eligibility
determinations and patient care. Consider, as a final example, the case
of Dr. Sean Tunis, former chief medical officer and director of the
Office of Clinical Standards and Quality at the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid (CMS). As the chief medical officer, Dr. Tunis had
direct authority over an agency that determines eligibility and
certification of medical services, therapies, and procedures for over 40
million individuals enrolled in the Medicare program -- a position
analogous to that of a medical director of a managed care
organization. 298  In June 2005, Dr. Tunis agreed to a one-year
suspension of his medical license for falsification of documents related
296 See Wynia et al., supra note 120.
297 See, e.g., www.aahp.org.
298 C. Connolly, Noted With Interest, WASHINGTON POST, August 9, 2005, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/08/08/AR2005080801222_pfhtml (last visited August 9,
2005).
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to the completion of continuing medical education courses.299  The
Maryland Board of Physicians accused Dr. Tunis of unprofessional
conduct when he falsely claimed to have completed continuing medical
education credits and submitted altered credentialing documentation.
30 0
As a licensed physician and federal employee, Dr. Tunis took a
pledge to work for the betterment of his patients as well in furtherance
of the common good of the United States of America. All federal
employees are required to take an affirmation oath upon entering their
first day of service and are required to comply with various federal
rules and regulations governing employee conduct and ethics to avoid
conflicts of interest and appearances of impropriety. 301 Thus, even a
high-ranking federal government official, who has taken an explicit
ethical oath and who is deemed to have only the best interests of the
public good at heart, is subject to the dilemmas of balancing
compliance with professional duties, ethics, professional judgment, and
the pressures of managed care principles and medical determination
decisions.
Without a doubt, the competing forces of law, medicine, and
ethics will continue to be intertwined within the managed care
environment. The practice of medicine, the standard of care for
patients, and medical determination decisions will continue to be
mediated against the legal system and codes of ethics so as to protect
patients and all interested stakeholders in the health care system. Is
ethics for sale? The short answer appears to be, within the managed
care context, "It depends on if you're caught."
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2004) (conflicts of interest for federal
employees); see also 5 U.S.C. § 101-505, et seq. (2004) (Ethics in Government Act of
1978).
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